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Abstract
Sound and complete axiomatizations are provided for a number of different logics involv-
ing modalities for knowledge and time. These logics arise from different choices for various
parameters. All the logics considered involve the discrete time linear temporal logic opera-
tors ‘next’ and ‘until’ and an operator for the knowledge of each of a number of agents. Both
the single agent and multiple agent cases are studied: in some instances of the latter there is
also an operator for the common knowledge of the group of all agents. Four different seman-
tic properties of agents are considered: whether they have a unique initial state, whether
they operate synchronously, whether they have perfect recall, and whether they learn. The
property of no learning essentially dual to perfect recall. Not all settings of these param-
eters lead to recursively axiomatizable logics, but sound and complete axiomatizations are
presented for all the ones that do.
∗This paper incorporates results from [HV86], [HV88b], and [Mey94].
†Much of the work on this paper was carried out while this author was at the IBM Almaden Research Center.
IBM’s support is gratefully acknowledged. The work was also supported in part by the NSF, under grants IRI-95-
03109 and IRI-96-25901, and the Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFSC), under grant F94620-96-1-0323.
1 Introduction
It has recently been argued that knowledge is a useful tool for analyzing the behavior and
interaction of agents in a distributed system (see [FHMV95] and the references therein). When
analyzing a system in terms of knowledge, not only is the current state of knowledge of the
agents in the system relevant, but also how that state of knowledge changes over time. A formal
propositional logic of knowledge and time was first proposed by Sato [Sat77]; many others have
since been proposed [FHV91, Leh84, LR86, PR85, Spa90]. Unfortunately, while these logics
often use similar or identical notation, they differ in a number of significant respects.
In [HV89], logics for knowledge and time were categorized along two major dimensions: the
language used and the assumptions made on the underlying distributed system. The proper-
ties of knowledge in a system turn out to depend in subtle ways on these assumptions. The
assumptions considered in [HV89] concern whether agents have unique initial states, operate
synchronously or asynchronously, have perfect recall, and whether they satisfy a condition called
no learning. There are 16 possible combinations of these assumptions on the underlying system.
Together with 6 choices of language, this gives us 96 logics in all. All the logics considered in
the papers mentioned above fit into the framework. In [HV89, HV88a], the complexity of these
logics is completely characterized; the results of these papers show how the subtle interplay
of the parameters can have a tremendous impact on complexity. The complexity results show
that some of these logics cannot be characterized axiomatically, since the set of valid formu-
las for these logics is not recursively enumerable. Of these 96 logics, 48 involve linear time
and 48 involve branching time. (The distinction between linear and branching time essentially
amounts to whether or not we can quantify over the possible executions of a program.) To
keep this paper to manageable length, we focus here on the linear time logics, and provide
axiomatic characterizations of all the linear time logics for which an axiomatization is possible
at all (i.e., for those logics for which the set of valid formulas is r.e.).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide formal
definitions for the logics we consider. In Section 2, we review the syntax and semantics of
all the logics of knowledge and time that we consider here. In particular, we review the four
assumptions on the underlying system that we axiomatize in this paper. In Section 3, we state
the axioms for all the systems. In Section 4, we introduce the notion of enriched systems,
which form the basis for all our completeness proofs. In Section 5, we prove soundness and
completeness for the axiom systems described in Section 3. The definition of no learning that
we use here is slightly different from that used in [FHMV95, HV86], although they agree in
many cases of interest. We discuss the motivation for our change in Section 6. We conclude
with some further discussion in Section 7.
2 The Formal Model: Language and Systems
The material in this section is largely taken from [HV89], and is repeated here to make this paper
self-contained. The reader is encouraged to consult [HV89] for further details and motivation.
The logics we are considering are all propositional. Thus, we start out with primitive
propositions p, q, . . . and we close the logics under negation and conjunction, so that if ϕ and
ψ are formulas, so are ¬ϕ and ϕ ∧ ψ. In addition, we close off under modalities for knowledge
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and time, as discussed below. As usual, we view true as an abbreviation for ¬(p ∧ ¬p), ϕ ∨ ψ
as an abbreviation for ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ), and ϕ⇒ ψ as an abbreviation for ¬ϕ ∨ ψ.
If we have m agents (in distributed systems applications, this would mean a system with m
processors), we add the modalities K1, . . . , Km. Thus, if ϕ is a formula, so is Kiϕ (read “agent
i knows ϕ”). We take Liϕ to be an abbreviation for ¬Ki¬ϕ. In some cases we also want to
talk about common knowledge, so we add the modalities E and C into the language; Eϕ says
that everyone knows ϕ, while Cϕ says ϕ is common knowledge.
There are two basic temporal modalities (sometimes called operators or connectives): a
unary operator © and a binary operator U . Thus, if ϕ and ψ are formulas, then so are ©ϕ
(read “next time ϕ”) and ϕU ψ (read “ϕ until ψ”). ✸ϕ is an abbreviation for trueU ϕ, while
✷ϕ is an abbreviation for ¬✸¬ϕ. Intuitively, ©ϕ says that ϕ is true at the next point (one
time unit later), ϕU ψ says that ϕ holds until ψ does, ✸ϕ says that ϕ is eventually true (either
in the present or at some point in the future), and ✷ϕ says that ϕ is always true (in the present
and at all points in the future). In [HV89], branching time operators are also considered, which
have quantifiers over runs. For example, ∀© is a branching time operator such that ∀©ϕ is true
when ©ϕ is true for all possible futures. Since we do not consider branching time operators
in this paper, we omit the formal definition here. We take CKLm to be the language for m
agents with all the modal operators for knowledge and linear time discussed above; KLm is the
restricted version without the common knowledge operator.
A system for m agents consists of a set R of runs, where each run r ∈ R is a function
from IN to Lm+1, where L is some set of local states. There is a local state for each agent,
together with a local state for the environment; intuitively, the environment keeps track of all
the relevant features of the system not described by the agents’ local states, such as messages
in transit but not yet delivered. Thus, r(n) has the form 〈le, l1, . . . , lm〉, where le is the state
of the environment, and li is the local state of agent i, for i = 1, . . . ,m; such a tuple is called
a global state. (Formally, we could view a system as a tuple (R, L,m), making the L and m
explicit. We have chosen not to do so in order to simplify notation. The L and m should always
be clear from context.) An interpreted system I for m agents is a tuple (R, π) where R is a
system for m agents, and π maps every point (r, n) ∈ R × IN to a truth assignment π(r, n) to
the primitive propositions (so that π(r, n)(p) ∈ {true, false} for each primitive proposition p).1
We now give semantics to CKLm and KLm. Given an interpreted system I = (R, π), we
write (I, r, n) |= ϕ if the formula ϕ is true at (or satisfied by) the point (r, n) of interpreted
system I. We define |= inductively for formulas of CKLm (for KLm we just omit the clauses
involving C and E). In order to give the semantics for formulas of the form Kiϕ, we need to
introduce one new notion. If r(n) = 〈l1, . . . , lm〉, r
′(n′) = 〈l′1, . . . , l
′
m〉, and li = l
′
i, then we say
that r(n) and r′(n′) are indistinguishable to agent i and write (r, n) ∼i (r
′, n′). Of course, ∼i
is an equivalence relation on global states (inducing an equivalence relations on points). Kiϕ
is defined to be true at (r, n) exactly if ϕ is true at all the points whose associated global state
1Note that while we are being consistent with [HV89] here, in [FHMV95], pi is taken to be a function from
global states (not points) to truth values. Essentially, this means that in [FHMV95] a more restricted class of
structures is considered, where pi is forced to be the same at any two points associated with the same global
state. Clearly our soundness results hold in the more restricted class of structures. It is also easy to see that our
completeness results hold in the more restricted class too. All our completeness proofs have (or can be easily
modified to have) the property that a structure is constructed where each point is associated with a different
global state, and thus is an instance of the more restrictive structures used in [FHMV95].
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is indistinguishable to i from that of (r, n). We proceed as follows:
• (I, r, n) |= p for a primitive proposition p iff π(r, n)(p) = true
• (I, r, n) |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff (I, r, n) |= ϕ and (I, r, n) |= ψ
• (I, r, n) |= ¬ϕ iff (I, r, n) 6|= ϕ
• (I, r, n) |= Kiϕ iff (I, r
′, n′) |= ϕ for all (r′, n′) such that (r, n) ∼i (r
′, n′)
• (I, r, n) |= Eϕ iff (I, r′, n′) |= Kiϕ for i = 1, . . . ,m
• (I, r, n) |= Cϕ iff (I, r′, n′) |= Ekϕ, for k = 1, 2, . . . (where E1ϕ = Eϕ and Ek+1ϕ =
EEkϕ)
• (I, r, n) |= ©ϕ iff (I, r, n+ 1) |= ϕ
• (I, r, n) |= ϕU ψ iff there is some n′ ≥ n such that (I, r, n′) |= ψ, and for all n′′ with
n ≤ n′′ < n′, we have (I, r, n′′) |= ϕ.
There is a graphical interpretation of the semantics of C which we shall find useful in the
sequel. Fix an interpreted system I. A point (r′, n′) in I is reachable from a point (r, n) if
there exist points (r0, n0), . . . , (rk, nk) such that (r, n) = (r0, n0), (r
′, n′) = (rk, nk), and for all
j = 0, . . . , k− 1 there exists i such that (rj , nj) ∼i (rj +1, nj +1). The following result is well
known (and easy to check).
Lemma 2.1: [HM92] (I, r, n) |= Cϕ iff (I, r′, n′) |= ϕ for all points (r′, n′) reachable from
(r, n).
As usual, we define a formula ϕ to be valid with respect to a class C of interpreted systems iff
(I, r, n) |= ϕ for all interpreted systems I ∈ C and points (r, n) in I. A formula ϕ is satisfiable
with respect to C iff for some I ∈ C and some point (r, n) in I, we have (I, r, n) |= ϕ.
We now turn our attention to formally defining the classes of interpreted systems of interest.
For some of these definitions, it will be useful to give a number of equivalent presentations.
Perfect recall means, intuitively, that an agent’s local state encodes everything that has
happened (for that agent’s point of view) thus far in the run. To make this precise, define agent
i’s local-state sequence at the point (r, n) to be the sequence l0, . . . , lk of states that agent i takes
on in run r up to and including time n, with consecutive repetitions omitted. For example, if
from time 0 through 4 in run r agent i goes through the sequence l, l, l′, l, l of states, its history
at (r, 4) is just l, l′, l. Roughly speaking, agent i has perfect recall if it “remembers” its history.
More formally, we say that agent i has perfect recall (alternatively, agent i does not forget)
in system R if at all points (r, n) and (r′, n′) in R, if (r, n) ∼i (r
′, n′), then r has the same
local-state sequence at both (r, n) and (r′, n′).
There are a number of equivalent characterizations of perfect recall. One characterization
that will prove particularly useful in the comparison with the concept of no learning, which
we are about to define, is the following. Let S = (s0, s1, s2, . . .) and T = (t0, t1, t2, . . .) be two
(finite or infinite) sequences and let ∼ be a relation on the elements of S and T . Then we say
that S and T are ∼-concordant if there is some k (k may be ∞) and nonempty consecutive
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Figure 1: A system where agent i has perfect recall
intervals S1, . . . , Sk of S and T1, . . . , Tk of T such that for all s ∈ Sj and t ∈ Tj, we have s ∼ t,
for j = 1, . . . , k.
Lemma 2.2: [HV86, Mey94] The following are equivalent.
(a) Agent i has perfect recall in system R.
(b) For all points (r, n) ∼i (r
′, n′) inR, ((r, 0), . . . , (r, n)) is ∼i-concordant with ((r
′, 0), . . . , (r′, n′)).
(c) For all points (r, n) ∼i (r
′, n′) in R, if n > 0, then either (r, n − 1) ∼i (r
′, n′) or there
exists a number l < n′ such that (r, n− 1) ∼i (r
′, l) and for all k with l < k ≤ n′ we have
(r, n) ∼i (r
′, k).
(d) For all points (r, n) ∼i (r
′, n′) in R, if k ≤ n, then there exists k′ ≤ n′ such that (r, k) ∼i
(r′, k′).
Proof: The implications from (a) to (b), from (b) to (c) and from (c) to (d) are straightforward.
The implication from (d) to (a) can be proved by a straightforward induction on n+ n′.
This lemma shows that perfect recall requires an unbounded number of local states in
general, since agent i may have an infinite number of distinct histories in a given system. A
system where agent i has perfect recall is shown in Figure 1, where the vertical lines denote
runs (with time 0 at the top) and all points that i cannot distinguish are enclosed in the same
region.
We remark that the official definition of perfect recall given here is taken from [FHMV95].
In [HV86], part (d) of Lemma 2.2 was taken as the definition of perfect recall (which was called
no forgetting in that paper).
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Roughly speaking, no learning is the dual notion to perfect recall. Perfect recall says that
if the agent considers run r′ possible at the point (r, n), in that there is a point (r′, n′) that
the agent cannot distinguish from (r, n), then the agent must have considered r′ possible at all
times in the past (i.e., at all points (r, k) with k ≤ n); it is not possible that the agent once
considered r′ impossible and then forgot this fact. No learning says that if the agent considers
r′ possible at (r, n), then the agent will consider r′ possible at all times in the future; the agent
will not learn anything that will allow him to distinguish r from r′. More formally, we define an
agent’s future local-state sequence at (r, n) to be the sequence of local states l0, l1, . . . that the
agent takes on in run r, starting at (r, n), with consecutive repetitions omitted. We say agent
i does not learn in system R if at all points (r, n) and (r′, n′) in R, if (r, n) ∼i (r
′, n′), then r
has the same future local-state sequence at both (r, n) and (r′, n′).
Just as with perfect recall, there are a number of equivalent formulations of no learning.
Lemma 2.3: The following are equivalent.
(a) Agent i does not learn in system R.
(b) For all points (r, n) ∼i (r
′, n′) inR, ((r, n), (r, n+1), . . .) is ∼i-concordant with ((r
′, n′), (r′, n′+
1), . . .).
(c) For all points (r, n) ∼i (r
′, n′) in R, either (r, n + 1) ∼i (r
′, n′) or there exists a number
l > n′ such that (r, n + 1) ∼i (r
′, l) and for all k with l > k ≥ n′ we have (r, n) ∼i (r
′, k).
Notice that we have no analogue to part (d) of Lemma 2.2 in Lemma 2.3 (where ≤ is
replaced by ≥). The analogue of (d) is strictly weaker than (a), (b), and (c), although they
are equivalent in synchronous systems (which we are about to define formally). It was just
this analogue of (d) that was used to define no learning in [HV86, HV89]. We examine the
differences between the notions carefully in Section 6, where we provide more motivation for
the definition chosen here.
In a synchronous system, we assume that every agent has access to a global clock that ticks
at every instant of time, and the clock reading is part of its state. Thus, in a synchronous system,
each agent always “knows” the time. More formally, we say that a system R is synchronous
if for all agents i and all points (r, n) and (r′, n′), if (r, n) ∼i (r
′, n′), then n = n′.2 Observe
that in a synchronous system where (r, n) ∼i (r
′, n), an easy induction on n shows that if
i has perfect recall and n > 0, then (r, n − 1) ∼i (r
′, n − 1), while if i does not learn, then
(r, n + 1) ∼i (r
′, n+ 1).
Finally, we say that a system R has a unique initial state if for all runs r, r′ ∈ R, we have
r(0) = r′(0). Thus, if R is a system with a unique initial state, then we have (r, 0) ∼i (r
′, 0)
for all runs r, r′ in R and all agents i.
We say that I = (R, π) is an interpreted system where agents have perfect recall (resp.,
agents do not learn, time is synchronous, there is a unique initial state) exactly if R is a system
with that property. We use Cm to denote the class of all interpreted systems for m agents,
2 We remark that in [HV86], a slightly weaker definition is given: There, a system is said to be synchronous if
for all runs r, if (r, n) ∼i (r, n
′) then n = n′. It is easy to show (by induction on n) that the two definitions are
equivalent for systems where agents have perfect recall. In general, however, they are different. The definition
given here is the one used in [FHMV95, HV89].
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and add the superscripts nl , pr , sync, and uis to denote particular subclasses of Cm. Thus,
for example, we use Cnl ,prm to denote the set of all interpreted systems with m agents that have
perfect recall and do not learn. We omit the subscript m when it is clear from context.
The results of [HV89, HV88a] (some of which are based on earlier results of Ladner and Reif
[LR86]) are summarized in Table 1. For ϕ ∈ KLm, we define ad(ϕ) to be the greatest number of
alternations of distinct Ki’s along any branch in ϕ’s parse tree. For example, ad(K1¬K2K1p) =
3; temporal operators are not considered, so that ad(K1✷K1p) = 1. (In Table 1, we do not
consider the language CKL1. This is because if m = 1, then Cϕ is equivalent to K1ϕ. Thus,
CKL1 is equivalent to KL1.) We omit the definitions of complexity classes such as Π
1
1 and
nonelementary time (ex (ad(ϕ)+1, c|ϕ|) here. (Note that c is a constant in the latter expression.)
All that matters for our purposes is that for the cases where the complexity is Π11 or co-r.e.,
there can be no recursive axiomatization; the validity problem is too hard. We provide complete
axiomatizations here for the remaining cases.
CKLm, m ≥ 2 KLm, m ≥ 2 KL1
Cprm , C
pr ,sync
m , C
pr ,uis
m , Π
1
1 nonelementary time double-exponential
Cpr ,sync,uism ex (ad(ϕ) + 1, c|ϕ|)) time
Cnlm , C
nl ,pr
m , C
nl ,pr ,sync
m , Π
1
1 nonelementary space EXPSPACE
Cnl ,syncm ex (ad(ϕ), c|ϕ|))
Cnl ,pr ,uism Π
1
1 Π
1
1 EXPSPACE
Cnl,uism co-r.e. co-r.e. EXPSPACE
Cnl ,sync,uism , C
nl ,pr ,sync,uis
m EXPSPACE EXPSPACE EXPSPACE
Cm, C
sync
m , C
sync,uis
m , C
uis
m EXPTIME PSPACE PSPACE
Table 1: The complexity of the validity problem for logics of knowledge and time
3 Axiom Systems
In this section, we describe the axioms and inference rules that we need for reasoning about
knowledge and time for various classes of systems, and state the completeness results. The
proofs of these results are deferred to Section 5.
For reasoning about knowledge alone, the following system, with axioms K1–K5 and rules
of inference R1–R2, is well known to be sound and complete [FHMV95, Hin62]:
K1. All tautologies of propositional logic
K2. Kiϕ ∧Ki(ϕ⇒ ψ)⇒ Kiψ, i = 1, . . . ,m
K3. Kiϕ⇒ ϕ, i = 1, . . . , n
K4. Kiϕ⇒ KiKiϕ, i = 1, . . . ,m
K5. ¬Kiϕ⇒ Ki¬Kiϕ, i = 1, . . . ,m
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R1. From ϕ and ϕ⇒ ψ infer ψ
R2. From ϕ infer Kiϕ, i = 1, . . . ,m
This axiom system is known as S5m.
For reasoning about the temporal operators individually, the following system (together
with K1 and R1), is well known to be sound and complete [FHMV95, GPSS80]:
T1. ©(ϕ) ∧©(ϕ⇒ ψ)⇒ ©ψ
T2. ©(¬ϕ)⇒ ¬©ϕ
T3. ϕU ψ ⇔ ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧©(ϕU ψ))
RT1. From ϕ infer ©ϕ
RT2. From ϕ′ ⇒ ¬ψ ∧©ϕ′ infer ϕ′ ⇒ ¬(ϕU ψ)
The system containing the above axioms and inference rules for both knowledge and time
is called S5Um. S5
U
m is easily seen to be sound for Cm, the class of all systems for m agents.
Given that there is no necessary connection between knowledge and time in Cm, it is perhaps
not surprising that S5Um should be complete with respect to Cm as well. Interestingly, even if we
impose the requirements of synchrony or uis, S5Um remains complete; our language is not rich
enough to capture these conditions.
Theorem 3.1: S5Um is a sound and complete axiomatization for the language KLm with respect
to Cm, C
sync
m , C
uis
m , and C
sync,uis
m , for all m.
We get the same lack of interaction between knowledge in the classes Cm, C
sync
m , C
uis
m , and
Csync,uism even when we add common knowledge. It is well known that the following two axioms
and inference rule characterize common knowledge [FHMV95, HM92]:
C1. Eϕ⇔
∧m
i=1Kiϕ
C2. Cϕ⇒ E(ϕ ∧ Cϕ)
RC1. From ϕ⇒ E(ψ ∧ ϕ) infer ϕ⇒ Cψ
Let S5CUm be the result of adding C1, C2, and RC1 to S5
U
m. We then have the following extension
of Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.2: S5CUm is a sound and complete axiomatization for the language CKLm with
respect to Cm, C
sync
m , C
uis
m , and C
sync,uis
m , for all m.
If we restrict attention to systems with perfect recall or no learning, then knowledge and
time do interact. We start by stating five axioms of interest, and then discuss them.
KT1. Ki✷ϕ⇒ ✷Kiϕ, i = 1, . . . ,m
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KT2. Ki©ϕ⇒ ©Kiϕ, i = 1, . . . ,m.
KT3. Kiϕ1 ∧©(Kiϕ2 ∧ ¬Kiϕ3)⇒ Li((Kiϕ1)U [(Kiϕ2)U ¬ϕ3]), i = 1, . . . ,m
KT4. Kiϕ1 U Kiϕ2 ⇒ Ki(Kiϕ1 U Kiϕ2), i = 1, . . . ,m.
KT5. ©Kiϕ⇒ Ki©ϕ, i = 1, . . . ,m.
Axiom KT1 was first discussed by Ladner and Reif [LR86]. Informally, this axiom states
that if a proposition is known to be always true, then it is always known to be true. It is not
hard to show, using Lemma 2.2, that axiom KT1 holds with perfect recall, that is, KT1 is valid
in Cprm . It was conjectured in an early draft of [FHMV95] that the system S5
U
m + KT1, would
be complete for Cprm . However, it was shown in [Mey94] that this conjecture was false. To get
completeness we need a stronger axiom: KT3.
It is not hard to see that KT3 is valid in systems with perfect recall. A formal proof
is provided in Section 5, but we can give some intuition here. Suppose (I, r, n) |= Kiϕ1 ∧
©(Kiϕ2 ∧ ¬Kiϕ3). That means that (I, r, n + 1) |= ¬Kiϕ3, so there must be some point
(r′, n′) ∼i (r, n + 1) such that (I, r
′, n′) |= ¬ϕ3. Because agent i has perfect recall, there must
exist some k′ ≤ n′ such that (r′, k′) ∼i (r, n). It is not hard to show, using Lemma 2.2(c), that
(I, r′, k′) |= Kiϕ1 U (Kiϕ2 U ¬ϕ3). It follows that (I, r, n) |= Li(Kiϕ1 U (Kiϕ2 U ¬ϕ3)).
In the presence of the other axioms, KT3 implies KT1.
Lemma 3.3: KT1 is provable in S5Um +KT3.
Proof: Note that by purely temporal reasoning, we can show ⊢ ✷ϕ ⇔ ✷✷ϕ. Using R2 and
K2, this implies that ⊢ Ki✷ϕ ⇔ Ki✷✷ϕ. Now if ϕ1 = ϕ2 = true, then KT3 simplifies to
©¬Kiϕ3 ⇒ ¬Ki✷ϕ3. In particular, taking the contrapositive, substituting ϕ3 = ✷ϕ, and using
T2, we obtain ⊢ Ki✷✷ϕ⇒ ©Ki✷ϕ, which yields ⊢ Ki✷ϕ⇒ ©Ki✷ϕ by the equivalence noted
above. It is also straightforward to show that ✷ϕ ⇒ ϕ, from which it follows, using K2 and
R2, that ⊢ Ki✷ϕ⇒ Kiϕ. The axiom KT1 now follows using the rule RT2.
KT3 turns out to be strong enough to give us completeness, with or without the condition
uis.
Theorem 3.4: S5Um+KT3 is a sound and complete axiomatization for the language KLm with
respect to Cprm and C
pr ,uis
m , for all m.
Theorem 3.1 shows that requiring synchrony or uis does not have an impact when we
consider the class of all systems—Cm, C
sync
m , C
uis
m , and C
sync,uis
m are all axiomatized by S5
U
m—and
Theorem 3.4 shows that adding uis does not have an impact in the presence of perfect recall.
However, requiring synchrony does have an impact in the presence of perfect recall. It is easy
to see that KT2 is valid in Cpr ,syncm , and it clearly is not valid in C
pr
m . Moreover, KT2 suffices
for completeness in Cpr ,syncm ; we do not need the complications of KT3.
Theorem 3.5: S5Um+KT2 is a sound and complete axiomatization for the language KLm with
respect to Cpr ,syncm and C
pr ,sync,uis
m , for all m.
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KT4 is the axiom that characterizes no learning. More precisely, we have
Theorem 3.6: S5Um+KT4 is a sound and complete axiomatization for the language KLm with
respect to Cnlm for all m.
Unlike previous cases, the uis assumption is not innocuous in the presence of nl. For one
thing, it is not hard to check that assuming uis leads to extra properties. Indeed, as Table 1
shows, if m ≥ 2, then assuming a unique initial state along with no learning results in a class of
systems that do not have a recursive axiomatic characterization, since the validity problem is
co-r.e. On the other hand, if there is only one agent in the picture, things simplify. No learning
together with uis implies perfect recall. Thus, we get
Theorem 3.7: S5Um + KT3 + KT4 is a sound and complete axiomatization for the language
KLm with respect to C
nl ,pr
m for all m. Moreover, it is a sound and complete axiomatization for
the language KL1 with respect to C
nl ,pr ,uis
1 .
In synchronous systems with no learning, things again become simpler. KT5, the converse
of KT2, suffices to characterize such systems.
Theorem 3.8: S5Um+KT5 is a sound and complete axiomatization for the language KLm with
respect to Cnl ,syncm .
Of course, it follows from Theorem 3.8 that KT4 can be derived in the system S5Um + KT5
(although this result takes some work to prove directly).
Not surprisingly, if we combine perfect recall, no learning, and synchrony, then KT2 and
KT5 give us a complete axiomatization.
Theorem 3.9: S5Um + KT2 + KT5 is a sound and complete axiomatization for the language
KLm with respect to C
nl ,pr ,sync
m for all m.
Finally, it can be shown that when we combine no learning, synchrony, and uis, then not
only do all agents consider the same worlds possible initially, but they consider the same worlds
possible at all times. As a result, the axiom Kiϕ⇔ Kjϕ is valid in this case. This allows us to
reduce to the single-agent case. Moreover, as we observed above, in the single-agent case, no
learning and uis imply perfect recall. Thus, we get the following result.
Theorem 3.10: S5Um +KT2 + KT5 + {Kiϕ ⇔ K1ϕ} is a sound and complete axiomatization
for the language KLm with respect to C
nl ,sync,uis
m and C
nl ,pr ,sync,uis
m for all m.
A glance at Table 1 shows that we have now provided axiomatizations for all the cases where
complete axiomatizations exist. (Notice that for the language CKLm, if m = 1, then common
knowledge reduces to knowledge, while if m > 1, then complete axiomatizations can exist only
for Cm, C
sync
m , C
uis
m , C
sync,uis
m , C
nl ,sync,uis
m , and C
nl ,pr ,sync,uis
m . The first four cases were dealt with
in Theorem 3.2, while in the last two, as we have observed, common knowledge reduces to the
knowledge of agent 1.)
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4 A Framework for Completeness Proofs
In this section we develop a general framework for completeness proofs that reduces the work
required in each of the different completeness results to a single lemma.
A formula ψ is said to be consistent in a logic L if it is not the case that ⊢L ¬ψ. For
each of the pairs of logic L and class of systems C we consider, the proof that L is complete
with respect to C proceeds by constructing for every formula ψ consistent with respect to L, a
system in C containing a point at which ψ is true. All the results in this section hold for every
logic containing S5Um, except for Lemma 4.8, which mentions common knowledge. This lemma
holds for every logic containing S5CUm. Rather than mentioning the logic L explicitly in each
case, we just write ⊢ rather than ⊢L; the intended logic(s) will be clear from context. We also
fix the formula ψ, which is assumed to be consistent with respect to L.
A finite sequence σ = i1i2 . . . ik of agents, possibly equal to the null sequence ǫ, is called
an index if il 6= il+1 for all l < k. We write |σ| for the length k of such a sequence; the null
sequence has length equal to 0.
If S is a set, and S∗ is the set of all finite sequences over S, we define the absorptive
concatenation function # from S∗ × S to S∗ as follows. Given a sequence σ in S∗ and an
element x of S, we take σ#x = σ if the final element of σ is x. If the final element of σ is not
equal to x then we take σ#x to be σx, i.e. the result of concatenating x to σ. We shall have two
distinct uses for this function, applying it to primarily to sequences of agents, and sometimes
to sequences of “instantaneous states” of agents in the context of asynchronous systems.
If ψ ∈ CKLm, for each k ≥ 0, we define the k-closure clk(ψ), and for each agent i, we define
the k, i-closure clk,i(ψ). The definition of these sets proceeds by mutual recursion: First, we
let the basic closure cl0(ψ) be the smallest set containing ψ that is closed under subformulas,
contains ¬ϕ if it contains ϕ and ϕ is not of the form ¬ϕ′, contains ECϕ if it contains Cϕ, and
contains K1ϕ, . . . ,Knϕ if it contains Eϕ. (Of course, the last two clauses do not apply if ψ is
in KLm, and thus does not mention common knowledge.) If i is a agent, we take clk,i(ψ) to be
the union of clk(ψ) with the set of formulas of the form Ki(ϕ1 ∨ . . .∨ϕn) or ¬Ki(ϕ1 ∨ . . .∨ϕn),
where the ϕl are distinct formulas in clk(ψ). Finally, clk+1(ψ) is defined to be ∪
m
i=1clk,i(ψ).
If X is a finite set of formulas we write ϕX for the conjunction of the formulas in X. A finite
set X of formulas is said to be consistent if ϕX is consistent. If X is a finite set of formulas and
ϕ is a formula we write X ‖− ϕ when ⊢ ϕX ⇒ ϕ. Clearly if X ‖− ϕ1 and ⊢ ϕ1 ⇒ ϕ2 then
X ‖− ϕ2.
Suppose Cl is a finite set of formulas with the property that for all ϕ ∈ Cl, either ¬ϕ ∈ Cl
or ϕ is of the form ¬ϕ′ and ϕ′ ∈ Cl. (Note that the sets clk(ψ) and clk,i(ψ) have this property.)
We define an atom of Cl to be a maximal consistent subset of Cl. Evidently, if X is an atom
of Cl and ϕ ∈ Cl, then either X ‖− ϕ or X ‖− ¬ϕ. Thus, we have that
Lemma 4.1: ⊢
∨
X an atom of Cl ϕX .
We begin the construction of the model of ψ by first constructing a pre-model, which is a
structure 〈S,→,≈1, . . . ,≈n〉 consisting of a set S of states, a binary relation → on S, and for
each agent i an equivalence relation ≈i on S. Recall from Section 2 that for a formula ϕ ∈ KLm,
the alternation depth ad(ϕ) is the number of alternations of distinct operators Ki in ϕ. Let
d = ad(ψ) if ψ ∈ KLm; otherwise (that is, if ψ mentions the modal operator C), let d = 0.
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The set S consists of all the pairs (σ,X) such that σ is an index, |σ| ≤ d, and
1. if σ = ǫ then X is an atom of cld(ψ), and
2. if σ = τi then X is an atom of clk,i(ψ), where k = d− |σ|.
The relation → is defined so that (σ,X) → (τ, Y ) iff τ = σ and the formula ϕX ∧ ©ϕY is
consistent. If X is an atom we write X/Ki for the set of formulas ϕ such that Kiϕ ∈ X. We
say that states (σ,X) and (τ, Y ) are i-adjacent if σ#i = τ#i. The relation ≈i is defined so
that (σ,X) ≈i (τ, Y ) iff σ and τ are i-adjacent and X/Ki = Y/Ki. Clearly, i-adjacency is an
equivalence relation, as is the relation ≈i.
A σ-state (for ψ) is a pair (σ,X) as above. Thus (σ,X) is the unique σ-state with atom X.
If s = (σ,X) is a state, we define ϕs to be the formula ϕX , and write s ‖− ϕ for ⊢ ϕs ⇒ ϕ.
We say that the state s directly decides a formula ϕ if either (a) ϕ ∈ X or (b) ¬ϕ ∈ X or
(c) ϕ = ¬ϕ′ and ϕ′ ∈ X. Note that this implies that either s ‖− ϕ or s ‖− ¬ϕ. In case this
latter condition holds we say simply that s decides ϕ. Note that if σ = τi then each σ-state
directly decides every formula in cld−|σ|,i(ψ). Also, every ǫ-state directly decides every formula
in cld(σ).
Lemma 4.2: If s and t are i-adjacent states, then the same formulas of the form Kiϕ are
directly decided by s and t.
Proof: Suppose that s and t are i-adjacent, s is a σ-state, t is a τ -state. Clearly if σ = τ , then
s and t directly decide the same formulas (and, a fortiori, the same formulas of the form Kiϕ)
since they are both maximal consistent subsets of the same set of formulas. If σ 6= τ , then
either σ = τi or τ = σi. By symmetry, it suffices to deal with the case σ = τi. By definition,
s directly decides the Ki-formulas in cld−|σ|,i(ψ), while t directly decides the Ki-formulas in
cld−|τ |,j(ψ) if τ = τ
′j or cld(ψ) if τ = ǫ. We leave it to the reader to check that it follows that
the Ki-formulas directly decided by both s and t are precisely those in cld−|σ|,i(ψ).
If s is a σ-state, we take Φs,i to be the disjunction of the formulas ϕt, where t ranges over
the σ-states satisfying s ≈i t, and we take Φ
+
s,i to be the disjunction of the formulas ϕt, where
t ranges over the (σ#i)-states satisfying s ≈i t.
3 Observe that because ≈i is an equivalence
relation we have that if s ≈i t then Φs,i = Φt,i and Φ
+
s,i = Φ
+
t,i. The following result lists a
number of knowledge formulas decided by states.
Lemma 4.3:
(a) If s is a σ-state and t is a σ-state or (σ#i)-state such that s 6≈i t, then s ‖− Ki¬ϕt.
(b) For all σ-states s, we have s ‖− KiΦs,i; in addition, if |σ#i| ≤ d, then s ‖− KiΦ
+
s,i.
(c) For all σ-states s and (σ#i)-states t with s ≈i t, we have s ‖− Liϕt.
(d) If s is a σ-state and t is a (σ#i)-state such that s 6≈i t, then t ‖− ¬KiΦ
+
s,i.
3It can be shown that if |σ#i| ≤ d, then Φs,i is logically equivalent to Φ
+
s,i, but we do not need this fact here.
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Proof: For (a), suppose that s 6≈i t, where s = (σ,X) and t = (τ, Y ), where τ is either σ or σ#i.
Then X/Ki 6= Y/Ki so either there exists a formula Kiϕ ∈ X such that Kiϕ 6∈ Y or there exists
a formula Kiϕ ∈ Y such that Kiϕ 6∈ X. As the states s and t are i-adjacent, by Lemma 4.2,
in either case the formula Kiϕ is directly decided by both the states s and t. In the first case,
we have that ⊢ ϕt ⇒ ¬Kiϕ and hence, using R2, that ⊢ Ki(Kiϕ ⇒ ¬ϕt). By K4 we obtain
from the fact that Kiϕ ∈ X that s ‖− KiKiϕ. It now follows using K2 that s ‖− Ki¬ϕt. In
the second case, we have that ⊢ ϕt ⇒ Kiϕ, hence, using R2, that ⊢ Ki(¬Kiϕ ⇒ ¬ϕt). By
K4 we obtain from the fact that ¬Kiϕ ∈ X that s ‖− Ki¬Kiϕ. It now follows using K2 that
s ‖− Ki¬ϕt.
For (b), by Lemma 4.1, we have that ⊢
∨
X an atom of clk,i(ψ)
ϕX . Hence, by R2 we obtain
that ⊢ Ki
∨
σ−states t ϕt. It follows from this using (a) and K2 that s ‖− KiΦs,i. If |σ#i| ≤ d,
then a similar argument shows that s ‖− KiΦ
+
s,i.
For (c), suppose that s = (σ,X) ≈i (σ#i, Y ) = t and k = d − |σ#i|. We claim first that
if W = Y ∩ clk(ψ), then s ‖− Ki¬ϕt ⇔ Ki¬ϕW . This is because the fact that Y is a subset
of clk,i(ψ) implies that all formulas ϕ in Y \W are of the form Kiϕ
′ or ¬Kiϕ
′, hence ϕ ∈ X
if and only if ϕ ∈ Y . Also, by K4 and K5 we have that s ‖− KiKiϕ
′ when Kiϕ
′ ∈ X and
s ‖− Ki¬Kiϕ
′ when Kiϕ
′ 6∈ X. It follows using K2 that s ‖− KiϕY \W . Since ϕt is equivalent
to ϕW ∧ ϕY \W , we obtain using K2 that s ‖− Ki¬ϕt ⇔ Ki¬ϕW .
Now by K3 we have ⊢ ϕt ⇒ Liϕt. Further, the argument of the previous paragraph also
shows t ‖− Ki¬ϕt ⇔ Ki¬ϕW , so we obtain that t ‖− LiϕW . But ¬ϕW is equivalent to the
disjunction of a subset {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} of clk(ψ). Let α be the formula Ki(ϕ1 ∨ . . .∨ϕn), which is
equivalent toKi¬ϕW . It follows from the definition of clk,i(ψ) that α is in clk,i(ψ), hence directly
decided by both t and s. Consequently, α is not in Y , since t ‖− ¬α. Because X/Ki = Y/Ki,
the formula α is not in X either, so s ‖− ¬α. Applying the fact that α is equivalent to Ki¬ϕW ,
we see that s ‖− LiϕW . The equivalence of the previous paragraph now yields that s ‖− Liϕt.
For (d), note that if t and v are distinct (σ#i)-states then t ‖− ¬ϕv. Thus, if s is a σ-state
such that s 6≈i t then t ‖− ¬Φ
+
s,i, which implies, using K3, that t ‖− ¬KiΦ
+
s,i.
If T is a set of states, then we write ϕT for the disjunction of the formulas ϕt for t in T .
Using RT1, T1, and T2, the following result is immediate from the fact that s 6→ t implies
⊢ ϕs ⇒ ¬©ϕt, together with the fact that ⊢
∨
s a σ−state ϕs, which follows from Lemma 4.1.
Lemma 4.4: Let s be a state and let T be the set of states t such that s→ t. Then s ‖− ©ϕT
The next result provides a useful way to derive formulas containing the until operator.
Lemma 4.5: For all formulas α, β and γ, if ⊢ α ⇒ ¬γ and ⊢ α ⇒ ©(α ∨ (¬β ∧ ¬γ)) then
⊢ α⇒ ¬(β U γ).
Proof: Suppose that ⊢ α ⇒ ¬γ ∧©(α ∨ (¬β ∧ ¬γ)). By T3, we obtain that ⊢ α ∧ (β U γ) ⇒
¬γ ∧ ©(β U γ) ∧ ©(α ∨ (¬β ∧ ¬γ)). Since, by T3 again, ⊢ β U γ ⇒ ¬(¬β ∧ ¬γ), it follows
using T1 and RT1 that ⊢ α ∧ (β U γ) ⇒ ¬γ ∧ ©(α ∧ (β U γ)). Now using RT2 we obtain
⊢ α ∧ (β U γ)⇒ ¬(β U γ), which implies that ⊢ α⇒ ¬(β U γ).
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The following shows that the pre-model almost satisfies the truth definitions for formulas in
the basic closure. Note that every state directly decides all formulas in the basic closure. Define
a →-sequence of states to be a (finite or infinite) sequence s1, s2, . . . such that s1 → s2 → . . ..
Lemma 4.6: For all σ-states s, we have
(a) if ©ϕ ∈ cl0(ψ), then for all states t such that s→ t, we have s ‖− ©ϕ iff t ‖− ϕ,
(b) If Kiϕ ∈ cl0(ψ), then s ‖− ¬Kiϕ iff there is some σ-state t such that s ≈i t and t ‖− ¬ϕ.
Moreover, if |σ#i| ≤ d, then s ‖− ¬Kiϕ iff there is some (σ#i)-state t such that s ≈i t
and t ‖− ¬ϕ.
(c) if ϕ1 U ϕ2 ∈ cl0(ψ) then s ‖− ϕ1 U ϕ2 iff there exists a →-sequence s = s0 → s1 → . . .→
sn, where n ≥ 0, such that sn ‖− ϕ2, and sk ‖− ϕ1 for all k < n.
Proof: For part (a), suppose first that s ‖− ©ϕ and s → t. Since ϕ ∈ cl0(ψ), it follows
that t ‖− ϕ or t ‖− ¬ϕ. But, by T1 and T2, the latter would contradict the assumption that
ϕs ∧©ϕt is consistent. Hence we have t ‖− ϕ. Conversely, suppose that s → t and t ‖− ϕ.
Using T1, we have ⊢ ©ϕt ⇒ ©ϕ. Since ©ϕ ∈ cl0(ψ) we have either s ‖− ©ϕ or s ‖− ¬©ϕ.
But the latter would contradict s→ t, so we obtain s ‖− ©ϕ.
For the “if” direction of part (b), note that the fact that Kiϕ is in cl0(ψ) implies that if
s ≈i t and s ‖− Kiϕ, then t ‖− Kiϕ, hence t ‖− ϕ by K3. For the converse, suppose that
t ‖− ϕ for all σ-states t with s ≈i t. Then ⊢ Φs,i ⇒ ϕ, hence ⊢ KiΦs,i ⇒ Kiϕ, using K2
and R2. By Lemma 4.3(b), we have s ‖− KiΦs,i. It follows immediately that s ‖− Kiϕ. If
|σ#i| ≤ d, a similar argument shows that if t ‖− ϕ for all (σ#i)-states t such that s ≈i t, then
s ‖− Kiϕ.
For part (c), note that if ϕ1 U ϕ2 is in cl0(ψ), then every state directly decides each of
the formulas ϕ1, ϕ2, and ϕ1 U ϕ2. We first show that if there exists a sequence of states
s = s0 → s1 → . . . → sn such that sn ‖− ϕ2 and sk ‖− ϕ1 for all k < n then s ‖− ϕ1 U ϕ2.
We proceed by induction on n. The case n = 0 is immediate from T3. For the general case,
notice that it follows from the induction hypothesis that s1 ‖− (ϕ1 U ϕ2). Since s0 → s1, it
follows that ϕs0 ∧©(ϕ1 U ϕ2) is consistent. By assumption, we also have s0 ‖− ϕ1. Using T3,
we see that s0 ‖− ¬(ϕ1 U ϕ2) would be a contradiction. Hence s0 ‖− ϕ1 U ϕ2.
The converse follows immediately from Lemma 4.7 below.
Lemma 4.7: If ϕs ∧ ϕ1 U ϕ2 is consistent, then there exists a →-sequence s = s0 → s1 →
. . .→ sn, such that ϕsn ∧ ϕ2 is consistent, and ϕsk ∧ ϕ1 is consistent for all k < n.
Proof: Suppose by way of contradiction that ϕs ∧ ϕ1 U ϕ2 is consistent and no appropriate
→-sequence exists. Let T be the smallest set S of states such that (i) s ∈ S, and (ii) if t ∈ S,
t → u, and su ∧ ϕ1 is consistent, then u ∈ S. Then we have that t ‖− ¬ϕ2 for all t ∈ T , so
⊢ ϕT ⇒ ¬ϕ2. In addition, for each t ∈ T and state u such that t → u, we have either u ∈ T
or u ‖− ¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2. Thus, using Lemma 4.4, we obtain ⊢ ϕT ⇒ ©(ϕT ∨ (¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2)). It
now follows using Lemma 4.5 that ⊢ ϕT ⇒ ¬(ϕ1 U ϕ2). In particular, since s ∈ T , we have
s ‖− ¬(ϕ1 U ϕ2), which contradicts the assumption that ϕs ∧ ϕ1 U ϕ2 is consistent.
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For the next result, recall that when the formula ψ contains the common knowledge operator
we take d = 0, so that all states are ǫ-states.
Lemma 4.8: If Cϕ ∈ cl0(ψ), then s ‖− ¬Cϕ iff there is a state t reachable from s through
the relations ≈i such that t ‖− ¬ϕ.
Proof: The implication from right to left is a straightforward consequence of the fact that
if t ‖− ¬ϕ then t ‖− ¬Cϕ, by C1, C2 and K3, together with the fact that if t ≈i t
′, then
t ‖− Cϕ if and only if t′ ‖− Cϕ. (Proof of the latter fact: If t ‖− Cϕ then t ‖− KiCϕ by
C1 and C2. Hence, since t ≈i t
′ and KiCϕ ∈ cl0(ψ), we must have t
′ ‖− Cϕ. The opposite
direction follows symmetrically.) This leaves only the implication from left to right, for which
we prove the contrapositive. Suppose that no state containing ¬ϕ is reachable from s by means
of a sequence of steps through the relations ≈i. Let T be the set of states reachable from
s. By Lemma 4.3(a), if t and t′ are states with t 6≈i t
′ then t ‖− Ki¬ϕt′ . It follows from
this that t ‖− KiϕT for every state t ∈ T and agent i. Thus, because ⊢ ϕT ⇒ ϕ we have
⊢ ϕT ⇒ E(ϕT ∧ ϕ). By RC1 it follows that ⊢ ϕT ⇒ Cϕ. Since s ∈ T , it is immediate that
s ‖− Cϕ.
We say that an infinite →-sequence of states (s0, s1, . . .), where sn = (σ,Xn) for all n, is
acceptable if for all n ≥ 0, if ϕ1 U ϕ2 ∈ Xn then there exists an m ≥ n such that sm ‖− ϕ2 and
sk ‖− ϕ1 for all k with n ≤ k < m.
Definition 4.9: An enriched system for ψ is a pair (R,Σ), where R is a set of runs and Σ is
a partial function mapping points in R×N to states for ψ such that the following hold, for all
runs r ∈ R:
1. If Σ(r, n) is defined then Σ(r, n′) is defined for all n′ > n, and Σ(r, n),Σ(r, n + 1), . . . is
an acceptable →-sequence.
2. For all points (r, n) ∼i (r
′, n′), if Σ(r, n) is defined then Σ(r′, n′) is defined and Σ(r, n) ≈i
Σ(r′, n′).
3. If Σ(r, n) and s are σ-states such that Σ(r, n) ≈i s, then there exists a point (r
′, n′) such
that (r, n) ∼i (r
′, n′) and Σ(r′, n′) = s.
4. if Cϕ ∈ cl0(ψ) and Σ(r, n) ‖− ¬Cϕ, then there exists a point (r
′, n′) reachable from (r, n)
such that Σ(r′, n′) ‖− ¬ϕ.
An enriched+ system for ψ is a pair (R,Σ) satisfying conditions 1, 2, and the following
modification of 3:
3′. If Σ(r, n) is a σ-state and s is a (σ#i)-state such that Σ(r, n) ≈i s, then there exists a
point (r′, n′) such that (r, n) ∼i (r
′, n′) and Σ(r′, n′) = s.
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Given an enriched (resp., enriched+) system (R,Σ), we obtain an interpreted system I =
(R, π) by defining the valuation π on basic propositions p by π(r, n)(p) = true just when Σ(r, n)
is defined and Σ(r, n) ‖− p. The following theorem gives a sufficient condition for a formula in
the basic closure to hold at a point in this standard system. If σ is the index i1# . . .#ik, let
Kσϕ be an abbreviation for Ki1 . . . Kikϕ. (If σ = ǫ, then we take Kσϕ to be ϕ.)
Theorem 4.10:
(a) If (R,Σ) is an enriched system for ψ, I is the associated interpreted system, ϕ is in the
basic closure cl0(ψ), and Σ(r, n) is defined, then (I, r, n) |= ϕ if and only if Σ(r, n) ‖− ϕ.
(b) If (R,Σ) is an enriched+ system for ψ ∈ KLm, I is the associated standard system, ϕ is
in the basic closure cl0(ψ), Σ(r, n) is a σ-state, and ad(Kσϕ) ≤ d, then (I, r, n) |= ϕ if
and only if Σ(r, n) ‖− ϕ.
Proof: We first prove part (a). We proceed by induction on the complexity of ϕ. If ϕ is a
propositional constant then the result is immediate from the definition of I. The cases where
ϕ is of the form ¬ϕ1 or ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 are similarly trivial. This leaves five cases:
Case 1: Suppose that ϕ is of the form ©ϕ1. Then (I, r, n) |= ϕ if and only if (I, r, n+1) |=
ϕ1. Note that Σ(r, n + 1) must be defined by Condition 1 of Definition 4.9. Since ϕ1 is a
subformula of ϕ it is in cl0(ψ), so it follows by the induction hypothesis that (I, r, n+ 1) |= ϕ1
holds precisely when Σ(r, n + 1) ‖− ϕ1. By Condition 1, Σ(r, n) → Σ(r, n + 1), so we obtain
from Lemma 4.6(a) that Σ(r, n + 1) ‖− ϕ1 if and only if Σ(r, n) ‖− ©ϕ1. Putting the pieces
together, we get (I, r, n) |= ϕ if and only if Σ(r, n) ‖− ϕ.
Case 2: Suppose that ϕ is of the form ϕ1 U ϕ2. Then the subformulas ϕ1 and ϕ2 are also
in cl0(ψ). Note also that by Condition 1 of Definition 4.9, Σ(r, n
′) is defined for all n′ ≥ n,
and Σ(r, n),Σ(r, n + 1), . . . is an admissible →-sequence. Thus, if Σ(r, n) ‖− ϕ1 U ϕ2, then
by Lemma 4.6(c) there exists some n′ ≥ n such that Σ(r, n′) ‖− ϕ2 and Σ(r, k) ‖− ϕ1 for
n ≤ k < n′. By the induction hypothesis, this implies that (I, r, n′) |= ϕ2 and (I, r, k) |= ϕ1
for n ≤ k < n′. In other words, we have (I, r, n) |= ϕ1 U ϕ2. Conversely, if (I, r, n) |= ϕ1 U ϕ2,
then by the induction hypothesis and the semantics of U we have that there exists some n′ ≥ n
such that Σ(r, n′) ‖− ϕ2 and Σ(r, k) ‖− ϕ1 for n ≤ k < n
′. Since Σ(r, n) → Σ(r, n + 1) →
. . .→ Σ(r, n′), it follows using Lemma 4.6(c) that Σ(r, n) ‖− ϕ1 U ϕ2.
Case 3: Suppose that ϕ is of the form Kiϕ1. We first show that Σ(r, n) ‖− Kiϕ1 implies
(I, r, n) |= Kiϕ1. Assume Σ(r, n) ‖− Kiϕ1 and suppose that (r, n) ∼i (r
′, n′). Then by Con-
dition 2 of Definition 4.9, we have that that Σ(r′, n′) is defined and Σ(r, n) ≈i Σ(r
′, n′). Since
Kiϕ ∈ cl0(ψ) we obtain Σ(r, n
′) ‖− Kiϕ1. By K3 this implies Σ(r, n
′) ‖− ϕ1. Since ϕ ∈ cl0(ψ),
by the induction hypothesis, we obtain that (I, r′, n′) |= ϕ1. This shows that (I, r
′, n′) |= ϕ1
for all points (r′, n′) ∼i (r, n). That is, we have (I, r, n) |= Kiϕ1.
For the converse, suppose that Σ(r, n) ‖− ¬Kiϕ1 and that Σ(r, n) is a σ-state. By Lemma 4.6(b),
there exists a σ-state t such that Σ(r, n) ≈i t and t ‖− ¬ϕ1. By Condition 3 of Definition 4.9,
there exists a point (r′, n′) such that (r, n) ∼i (r
′, n′) and Σ(r′, n′) = t. Using the induction
hypothesis we obtain that (I, r′, n′) |= ¬ϕ1. It follows that (I, r, n) |= ¬Kiϕ1.
Case 4: If ϕ is of the form Eϕ1, the result follows easily from the induction hypothesis,
using axiom C1.
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Case 5: Suppose ϕ is of the form Cϕ1. By Condition 2 of Definition 4.9 we have that
Σ(r′, n′) is defined for all (r′, n′) reachable from (r, n). An easy induction on the length of the
path from (r, n) to (r′, n′), using the fact that KiCϕ1 is in the basic closure and axioms C1, C2,
and K3, can be used to show that Σ(r′, n′) ‖− Cϕ1 for each point (r
′, n′) reachable from (r′, n).
Using C1, C2, and K3, it is easy to see that Σ(r′, n′) ‖− ϕ1. By the induction hypothesis, this
implies that (I, r′, n′) |= ϕ1. Thus, (I, r, n) |= Cϕ1.
For the converse, suppose that Σ(r, n) ‖− ¬Cϕ1. Then by Condition 4 of Definition 4.9, we
have Σ(r′, n′) ‖− ¬ϕ1 for some point (r
′, n′) reachable from (r, n). By the induction hypothesis,
we have that (I, r′, n′) |= ¬ϕ1, and hence (I, r, n) |= ¬Cϕ1.
For part (b), since ψ ∈ KLm, we only need to check the analogues of cases 1, 2, and 3
above. The proofs in cases 1 and 2 are identical to those above. The proof of case 3 is also
quite similar, but we must be a little careful in applying the inductive hypothesis. So suppose
that ϕ is of the form Kiϕ1, Σ(r, n) is a σ-state, and ad(Kσϕ) ≤ d. The implication from left
to right, showing that if Σ(r, n) ‖− Kiϕ then (I, r, n) |= Kiϕ is identical to that above. We
just need the observation that if (r, n) ∼i (r
′, n′), then Σ(r′, n′) is a τ -state, where τ#i = σ#i.
It follows that ad(Kτϕ) ≤ ad(Kσ#iϕ) ≤ ad(KσKiϕ) ≤ d, so we can apply the inductive
hypothesis to conclude that (I, r′, n′) |= ϕ1. For the converse, the proof is again similar. Note
that if ad(KσKiϕ) ≤ d, then |σ#i| ≤ d, so by Lemma 4.6(b), there exists a (σ#i)-state t such
that Σ(r, n) ≈i t and t ‖− ¬ϕ1. By Condition 3
′ of Definition 4.9, there exists a point (r′, n′)
such that (r, n) ∼i (r
′, n′) and Σ(r′, n′) = t. Since ad(Kσ#iϕ) = ad(KσKiϕ) ≤ d, using the
induction hypothesis we obtain that (I, r′, n′) |= ¬ϕ1. It follows that (I, r, n) |= ¬Kiϕ1.
Corollary 4.11: If (R,Σ) is an enriched (resp., enriched+) system for ψ, I is the associated
interpreted system, and (r, n) is a point of I such that Σ(r, n) is an ǫ-state and Σ(r, n) ‖− ψ,
then (I, r, n) |= ψ.
We apply this corollary in all our completeness proofs, constructing an appropriate enriched
or enriched+ system in all cases.
5 Proofs of Soundness and Completeness
We are now in a position to prove the completeness results claimed in Section 3. Sections 5.1-5.3
will deal with the cases involving only perfect recall, synchrony and unique initial states. The
cases involving no learning are a little more complex, and are dealt with in Sections 5.4-5.7.
5.1 Dealing with Cm, C
sync
m , C
uis
m , and C
sync,uis
m (Theorems 3.1 and 3.2)
The fact that S5CUm is sound for Cm, the class of all systems, is straightforward and left to
the reader (see also [FHMV95]). To prove completeness of S5Um for the language KLm and of
S5CUm for the language CKLm with respect to Cm, C
sync
m , C
uis
m , and C
sync,uis
m , we construct an
enriched system, and use Corollary 4.11. The proof proceeds in the same way whether or not
common knowledge is in the language. We assume here that the language includes common
knowledge and that we are dealing with the axiom system S5CUm when constructing the states
in the enriched structure. Recall that in this case we work with ǫ-states only.
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The following result suffices for the generation of the acceptable sequences required for the
construction of an enriched system in the cases not involving no learning; a more complex
construction will be required in the presence of no learning.
Lemma 5.1: Every finite →-sequence of states can be extended to an infinite acceptable se-
quence.
Proof: To see this, first note that for every σ-state s there exists a state t with s → t. For
otherwise, s ‖− ¬©ϕt for all σ-states t, which contradicts ⊢ ©
∨
t a σ−state ϕt. (Note that
⊢ ©
∨
t a σ−state ϕt follows from Lemma 4.1 and RT1.) Thus every finite sequence of states can
be extended to an infinite sequence, and it remains to show that the obligations arising from
the until formulas can be satisfied.
Suppose the finite →-sequence is s0 → . . . → sn, where sk = (σ,Xk) for k = 1 . . . n. Now,
for any formula ϕ1 U ϕ2 ∈ X0, it follows using T3 and the fact that the si directly decide each of
the formulas ϕ1, ϕ2, and ϕ1 U ϕ2 that either the obligation imposed by ϕ1 U ϕ2 at s0 is already
satisfied in the sequence (s0, . . . , sn), or else sn ‖− ϕ1 U ϕ2 and sk ‖− ϕ1 for 0 ≤ k ≤ n. In
the latter case, by Lemma 4.6(c), there exists a sequence sn → sn+1 → . . . → sn′ such that
sn′ ‖− ϕ2 and sk ‖− ϕ1 for n ≤ k < n
′. This gives a finite extension of the original sequence
that satisfies the obligation imposed by ϕ1 U ϕ2 at s0. Applying this argument to the remaining
obligations at s0, we eventually obtain a finite sequence that satisfies all the obligations at s0.
We may then move on to s1 and apply the same procedure. It is clear that in the limit we
obtain an acceptable sequence extending the original sequence.
For each agent i, define the function Oi to map the state (σ,U) to the pair (σ#i, U/Ki).
Oi is also used later in our other constructions. Given a state s, we call Oi(s) agent i’s current
information at s. Let x be a new object not equal to any state. We say that a sequence
S = (x, x, . . . , x, sN , sN+1, . . .) is an acceptable sequence from N if it starts with N copies of x
and the suffix (sN , sN+1, . . .) is an acceptable →-sequence of states for ψ. Given a sequence S
acceptable from N , we define a run r as follows. For each agent i, take ri(n) = (n, S) when
n < N and ri(n) = (n,Oi(sn)) otherwise. For the environment component e, take re(n) = Sn.
Let Rsync be the set of all runs so obtained, and define the partial function Σ on points in
Rsync ×N so that Σ(r, n) = sn when r is derived from a sequence (x, x, . . . , x, sN , sN+1, . . .)
acceptable from N and n ≥ N , and Σ(r, n) is undefined otherwise.
Lemma 5.2: The pair (Rsync ,Σ) is an enriched system.
Proof: It is immediate from the construction that (Rsync ,Σ) satisfies conditions 1 and 2 of
Definition 4.9. To see that it satisfies Condition 3, suppose that (r, n) is a point such that Σ(r, n)
is defined and Σ(r, n) ≈i s. By Lemma 5.1 there exists an acceptable sequence (sn, sn+1, . . .)
with s = sn. Let r
′ be the run obtained from the sequence (x, . . . , x, sn, sn+1, . . .). Then it is
immediate that (r, n) ∼i (r
′, n′) and Σ(r′, n′) = s. Finally, to see that it satisfies Condition 4,
suppose that Cϕ ∈ cl0(ψ) and Σ(r, n) ‖− ¬Cϕ. By Lemma 4.8, there is a state t reachable from
Σ(r, n) through the relations ≈i such that t ‖− ¬ϕ. An easy inductive argument on the length
of the path from Σ(r, n) to t, using Condition 3, shows that there is a point (r′, n′) reachable
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from (r, n) through the relations ∼i such that Σ(r
′, n′) = t. Thus, the enriched system satisfies
condition 4.
Clearly the systemRsync is synchronous, so the interpreted system I derived from (Rsync ,Σ)
is also synchronous. Let s be an ǫ-state such that s ‖− ψ. Such a state must exist because ψ
was assumed consistent. By Lemma 5.1 there exists an acceptable sequence (s0, s1, . . .) with
s = s0. Let r be the corresponding run in R
sync. Corollary 4.11 implies that (I, r, 0) |= ψ.
This establishes the completeness of the axiomatization S5CUm for the language CKLm (resp.,
of S5Um for the language KLm) with respect to the classes of systems Cm and C
sync
m . To establish
completeness of these axiomatizations for the corresponding languages with respect to the
classes of systems Cuism and C
sync,uis
m , we make use of the following result, which shows that
sound and complete axiomatizations for the class of systems satisfying some subset of the
properties of perfect recall and synchrony are also sound and complete axiomatizations for the
class of systems with the same subset of these properties, but with unique initial states in
addition. This completes the proofs of Theorem 3.1 and 3.2.
Lemma 5.3: Suppose x is a subset of {pr , sync}. If ϕ ∈ CKLm is satisfiable with respect to
Cxm, then it is also satisfiable with respect to C
x,uis
m .
Proof: Suppose I = (R, π) ∈ Cxm. We define a system I
′ by adding a new initial state to each
run in R. Formally, we define the system I ′ = (R′, π′) as follows. Let l be some local state that
does not occur in I and let se be any state of the environment. For each run r ∈ R, let r
+ be the
run such that r+(0) = (se, l, . . . , l) and r
+(n+1) = r(n). Let R′ = {r+ : r ∈ R}. The valuation
π′ is given by π′(r, 0)(p) = false and π′(r, n + 1)(p) = π(r, n)(p), for n ≥ 0 and propositions p.
It is clear that I ′ is a system with unique initial states. Moreover, if I is synchronous, then
so is I ′, and if I is a system with perfect recall then so is I ′. A straightforward induction on
the construction of the formula ϕ ∈ CKLm now shows that, for all points (r, n) in I, we have
(I, r, n) |= ϕ iff (I ′, r+, n+ 1) |= ϕ.
5.2 Dealing with Cprm and C
pr ,uis
m (Theorem 3.4)
We want to show that S5Um+KT3 is sound and complete with respect to C
pr
m . We first consider
soundness. As we observed above, all axioms and rules of inference other than KT3 are known
to be sound in all systems, so their soundness in systems Cprm is immediate. The next result
establishes soundness of KT3.
Lemma 5.4: All instances of KT3 are valid in Cprm .
Proof: To show that KT3 is sound, we assume that (I, r, n) |= Kiϕ1 ∧ ©(Kiϕ2 ∧ ¬Kiϕ3).
We show that (I, r, n) |= Li((Kiϕ1)U [(Kiϕ2)U ¬ϕ3]). Now it follows from the assumption
that (I, r, n + 1) |= ¬Kiϕ3, so there exists a point (r
′, n′) such that (r, n + 1) ∼i (r
′, n′) and
(I, r′, n′) |= ¬ϕ3. Since I ∈ C
pr
m , by condition (d) of Lemma 2.2 either (i) (r, n) ∼i (r
′, n′) or
(ii) there exists a number l < n′ such that (r, n) ∼i (r
′, l) and (r, n+ 1) ∼i (r
′, k) for all k with
l < k ≤ n′. We claim that in either case (I, r, n) |= Li((Kiϕ1)U [(Kiϕ2)U ¬ϕ3]). In case (i),
since (I, r′, n′) |= ¬ϕ3, we have (I, r
′, n′) |= (Kiϕ1)U [(Kiϕ2)U ¬ϕ3]. The desired conclusion
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is then immediate from the fact that (r, n) ∼i (r
′, n′). In case (ii), since (I, r, n) |= Kiϕ1, and
(r, n) ∼i (r
′, l), we have that (I, r′, l) |= Kiϕ1. Similarly, because (I, r, n + 1) |= Kiϕ2, we
obtain that (I, r′, k) |= Kiϕ2 for all k with l < k ≤ n
′. Together with (I, r′, n′) |= ¬ϕ3, this
implies that (I, r′, l) |= (Kiϕ1)U [(Kiϕ2)U ¬ϕ3]. Again, since (r, n) ∼i (r
′, l), we obtain that
(I, r, n) |= Li((Kiϕ1)U [(Kiϕ2)U ¬ϕ3]).
We now establish a lemma characterizing the interaction of knowledge and time in the pre-
model. This result will enable us to satisfy the perfect recall requirement in using the pre-model
to construct an interpreted system. It is convenient to introduce the notation [s]i, where s is a
state, for the set of (σ#i)-states t such that s ≈i t. The reader is encouraged to compare the
following result with condition (d) of Lemma 2.2.
Lemma 5.5: Suppose that the axiomatization includes KT3. Then for all σ-states s, t and for
all (σ#i)-states t′, if s→ t and t ≈i t
′, then either (a) s ≈i t
′ or (b) there exists a (σ#i)-state
s′ such that s ≈i s
′ and there exists a sequence of (σ#i)-states u0 → u1 → . . .→ un = t
′, where
n ≥ 0, such that s′ → u0 and ul ≈i ul+1 for all l = 0 . . . n− 1.
Proof: We derive a contradiction from the assumption that s→ t and t ≈i t
′, but s 6≈i t
′ and
for all (σ#i)-states s′ such that s ≈i s
′ and all sequences of (σ#i)-states u0 → u1 → . . . → un
such that s′ → u0 and ui ≈i ui+1 for i = 0 . . . n− 1, we have un 6= t
′. Let T be the smallest set
of (σ#i)-states such that
1. if v ∈ [s]i, v → v
′, and v′ ∈ [t]i then v
′ ∈ T , and
2. if v ∈ T , v → v′, and v′ ∈ [t]i then v
′ ∈ T .
Because s 6≈i t
′, it follows from the fact that ≈i is an equivalence relation that the intersection
[s]i ∩ [t]i is empty. Additionally, t
′ is not in T , for otherwise we could find a sequence of the
sort presumed not to exist. Thus, for all v ∈ T , we have ⊢ ϕv ⇒ ¬ϕt′ . This implies that
⊢ ϕT ⇒ ¬ϕt′ . Let T
′ be the set of (σ#i)-states v′ such that v → v′ for some v ∈ T . We want
to show that
v′ ‖− ϕT ∨ (¬KiΦ
+
t,i ∧ ¬ϕt′) (1)
for all v′ ∈ T ′. If v′ ∈ T , then clearly we have v′ ‖− ϕT , so (1) holds. If v
′ /∈ T , then the second
condition in the definition of T implies that v′ is not in [t]i. It follows using Lemma 4.3(d) that
v′ ‖− ¬KiΦ
+
t,i. Further, t 6≈i v
′ implies that v′ 6= t′, so v′ ‖− ¬ϕt′ . Thus, again we have (1).
Since (1) holds for all v′ ∈ T , it follows that ⊢ ϕT ′ ⇒ (ϕT∨(¬KiΦ
+
t,i∧¬ϕt′)). Now by Lemma 4.4,
we have ⊢ ϕT ⇒ ©ϕT ′ , so using T1 and RT1 we obtain that ⊢ ϕT ⇒ ©(ϕT ∨ (¬KiΦ
+
t,i∧¬ϕt′)).
Combining this with ⊢ ϕT ⇒ ¬ϕt′ and using Lemma 4.5, we get that ⊢ ϕT ⇒ ¬(KiΦ
+
t,i U ϕt′).
In particular, we obtain v ‖− ¬(KiΦ
+
t,i U ϕt′) for all states v in T .
We now repeat this argument to obtain a similar conclusion for the elements of [s]i. Since
t′ is not in [s]i we have that v ∈ [s]i implies v ‖− ¬ϕt′ . Further, since [s]i ∩ [t]i is empty
we also have by Lemma 4.3(d) that v ∈ [s]i implies v ‖− ¬KiΦ
+
t,i. Using T3 this yields that
⊢ Φ+s,i ⇒ ¬(KiΦ
+
t,i U ϕt′).
Let P be the set of (σ#i)-states v′ such that v → v′ for some v ∈ [s]i. Let v
′ ∈ P . We want
to show that
v′ ‖− Φ+s,i ∨ (¬KiΦ
+
s,i ∧ ¬(KiΦ
+
t,i U ϕt′)). (2)
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If v′ ∈ [s]i then clearly v
′ ‖− Φ+s,i, so (2) holds. If v
′ /∈ [s]i, then, by Lemma 4.3(d), we have that
v′ ‖− ¬KiΦ
+
s,i. We now consider two subcases: (a) v
′ ∈ T and (b) v′ 6∈ T . If v′ ∈ T then, as we
showed earlier, we have v′ ‖− ¬(KiΦ
+
t,i U ϕt′). If v
′ /∈ T , then by the definition of T it follows
that t 6≈i v
′. By Lemma 4.3(d), this implies that v′ ‖− ¬KiΦ
+
t,i. Further, since t ≈i t
′, we
also obtain that v′ 6= t′, so v′ ‖− ¬ϕt′ . Using T3, this yields v
′ ‖− ¬(KiΦ
+
t,i U ϕt′), and again
we have (2). Using Lemma 4.4, we obtain that ⊢ Φ+s,i ⇒ ©[Φ
+
s,i ∨ (¬KiΦ
+
s,i ∧ ¬(KiΦ
+
t,i U ϕt′))].
Applying Lemma 4.5 to this and the result of the preceding paragraph establishes that ⊢ Φ+s,i ⇒
¬(KiΦ
+
s,i U (KiΦ
+
t,i U ϕt′)).
It follows using Lemma 4.3(b), R2, and K2 that s ‖− Ki¬(KiΦ
+
s,iU (KiΦ
+
t,i U ϕt′)). By
KT3, we obtain s ‖− ¬(KiΦ
+
s,i∧©(KiΦ
+
t,i ∧Liϕt′)). Since, by Lemma 4.3(b), s ‖− KiΦ
+
s,i, we
obtain using T2 that s ‖− ©¬(KiΦ
+
t,i ∧ Liϕt′)). Because s → t, we have that ϕs ∧ ©ϕt
is consistent, so it follows that ϕt ∧ ¬(KiΦ
+
t,i ∧ Liϕt′) is consistent. But, by Lemma 4.3,
t ‖− KiΦ
+
t,i ∧ Liϕt′ , so this is a contradiction.
We are now ready to define, for each consistent ψ, an enriched+ system for ψ that es-
tablishes completeness of S5Um + KT3 with repect to C
pr
m . The runs of this system are those
derived from the acceptable sequences (s0, s1, . . .) (of states for ψ) by putting re(n) = sn and
ri(n) = Oi(s0)# . . .#Oi(sn), for each agent i and n ≥ 0. Thus, ri(n) is the sequence of current
information that agent i has had up to time n. Let Rpr be the set of runs defined in this way.
The function Σ is given by Σ(r, n) = sn for each n ≥ 0.
Lemma 5.6: Suppose that the axiomatization includes KT3. Then (Rpr ,Σ) is an enriched+
system.
Proof: It is clear that (Rpr ,Σ) satisfies Conditions 1 and 2 of Definition 4.9. It remains to
show that Condition 3′ holds. So suppose that Σ(r, n) is a σ-state and Σ(r, n) ≈i s for some
(σ#i)-state s. We must find a point (r′, n′) such that Σ(r′, n′) = s.
The proof proceeds by induction on n. The result for n = 0 is immediate, since we can
take r′ to be an acceptable sequence starting from s (such a sequence exists by Lemma 5.1), so
Σ(r′, 0) = s and clearly (r, 0) ∼i (r
′, 0).
Now suppose n > 0 and the result holds for n − 1. Because Σ(r, n − 1) → Σ(r, n) and
Σ(r, n) ≈i s, it follows by Lemma 5.5 that either (a) Σ(r, n−1) ≈i s or (b) there exists a (σ#i)-
state s′ such that Σ(r, n−1) ≈i s
′ and there exists a sequence of (σ#i)-states u0 → u1 → . . .→
uk such that s
′ → u0, ul ≈i ul+1 for l = 0 . . . k − 1, and uk = s. By the induction hypothesis,
there exists for any (σ#i)-state t with Σ(r, n−1) ≈i t a point (r
′, n′) such that (r, n−1) ∼i (r
′, n′)
and Σ(r′, n′) = t. In case (a), we take t = s, and we then have that Σ(r, n − 1) ≈i Σ(r, n) and
Σ(r′, n′) = s. It follows that (r, n) ∼i (r
′, n − 1), and by the transitivity of ∼i, we also have
(r, n) ∼i (r
′, n′). Hence we are done. In case (b), we take t = s′. Suppose that r′ is derived from
the sequence (v0, v1, . . .). Let r
′′ be any run derived from an acceptable sequence with initial
segment (v0, . . . , vn′ , u0, . . . , uk). Again, such a run exists by Lemma 5.1. By construction,
Σ(r′′, n′ + k + 1) = uk = s. Moreover, since r
′′
i (n
′) = r′i(n
′) = ri(n − 1) and Oi(ul) = Oi(s) for
all l = 0, . . . , k, we have r′′i (n
′+k+1) = r′′i (n
′)#Oi(u0)# . . .#Oi(uk) = ri(n−1)#Oi(s) = ri(n),
and hence (r, n) ∼i (r
′′, n′ + k + 1).
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Now take any ǫ-state s such that s ‖− ψ, and let r be a run derived from an acceptable
sequence starting with s. By construction, the system I obtained from the enriched+ system
is in Cprm , and by Corollary 4.11, we have (I, r, 0) |= ψ. Thus, ψ is satisfiable in C
pr
m . By
Lemma 5.3, ψ is also satisfiable in systems in Cpr ,uism . Since this argument applies to any
formula ψ consistent with respect to S5Um +KT3, this completes the proof of Theorem 3.4.
5.3 Dealing with Cpr ,syncm and C
pr ,sync,uis
m (Theorem 3.5)
We now show that S5Um +KT2 is sound and complete with respect to KLm for the classes of
systems Cpr ,syncm and C
pr ,sync,uis
m . For soundness, the following result suffices.
Lemma 5.7: All instances of KT2 are valid in Cpr ,syncm .
Proof: Let I be a system in Cpr ,syncm and let r be a run of I. Suppose that (I, r, n) |= Ki©ϕ.
If (r, n + 1) ∼i (r
′, n′), then by synchrony we must have n′ = n + 1. Thus, by perfect recall
and synchrony, we have (r, n) ∼i (r
′, n′ − 1). It follows that (I, r′, n′ − 1) |= ©ϕ, which implies
that (I, r′, n′) |= ϕ. This shows that (I, r′, n′) |= ϕ for all (r′, n′) ∼i (r, n + 1). Thus, we have
(I, r, n + 1) |= Kiϕ, and hence (I, r, n) |= ©Kiϕ.
Before constructing an enriched+ system for the completeness part, we first note a property
of the pre-model, analogous to Lemma 5.5.
Lemma 5.8: Suppose that the axiomatization includes KT2. Then for all σ-states s, t with
s → t, we have that for all (σ#i)-states t′ with t ≈i t
′ there exists a (σ#i)-state s′ such that
s ≈i s
′ and s′ → t′.
Proof: By way of contradiction, suppose that s, t are σ-states with s→ t that t′ is a (σ#i)-state
such that t ≈i t
′, but that for all (σ#i)-states s′ such that s ≈i s
′, we have that s′ ‖− ¬©ϕt′ .
By T2, we have that s′ ‖− ©¬ϕt′ for all (σ#i)-states s
′ such that s ≈i s
′. By Lemma 4.3(b),
it follows that s ‖− Ki©¬ϕt′ . By KT2, we have that s ‖− ©Ki¬ϕt′ . Since s → t, it follows
that ϕt ∧Ki¬ϕt′ is consistent. However, since t ≈i t
′, by Lemma 4.3(c), we have t ‖− Liϕt′ .
This is a contradiction.
To construct the enriched+ system, we now take Rpr ,sync to be the set of runs r derived
from acceptable sequences (s0, s1, . . .) of states for the formula ψ by putting re(n) = sn and
ri(n) = Oi(s0) . . . Oi(sn), for each agent i and n ≥ 0. The notation Oi(s0) . . . Oi(sn) is meant
to denote the sequence formed by concatening Oi(s0), Oi(s1), . . . , Oi(sn). Thus, the length of
the sequence is n+1, which enforces synchrony. Again, the function Σ is given by Σ(r, n) = sn
for each n ≥ 0.
Lemma 5.9: Suppose that the axiomatization includes KT2. Then (Rpr ,sync,Σ) is an enriched+
system.
Proof: Conditions 1 and 2 of the definition of an enriched+ system are immediate. To show
that Condition 3′ holds, suppose that Σ(r, n) is a σ-state, and t is a (σ#i)-state such that
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Σ(r, n) ≈i t. Suppose that r is derived from the acceptable sequence (s0, s1, . . .), so Σ(r, n) = sn.
It follows from Lemma 5.8 that there exists a →-sequence t0 → . . . → tn such that tn = t and
sj ≈i tj for j = 1 . . . n. By Lemma 5.1, this sequence may be extended to an infinite acceptable
sequence. Taking r′ to be the run derived from this sequence, we see that (r, n) ∼i (r
′, n) and
Σ(r′, n) = t.
Take Ipr ,sync to be the system obtained from (Rpr ,sync,Σ). By construction, this system
is in Cpr ,sync. Now take any ǫ-state s such that s ‖− ψ, and let r be a run derived from an
acceptable sequence starting with s. By construction, the system I obtained from the enriched+
system is in Cpr ,syncm , and by Corollary 4.11, we have (I, r, 0) |= ψ. Thus, ψ is satisfiable in
Cpr ,syncm . By Lemma 5.3, ψ is also satisfiable in systems in C
pr ,sync,uis
m . Since this argument
applies to any formula ψ consistent with respect to S5Um + KT2, this completes the proof of
Theorem 3.5.
5.4 Dealing with Cnlm (Theorem 3.6)
We want to show that S5Um + KT4 is sound and complete for KLm with respect to C
nl
m . For
soundness, it suffices to show that KT4 is valid in Cnlm . This is straightforward.
Lemma 5.10: All instances of KT4 are valid in Cnlm .
Proof: Suppose that I ∈ Cnlm and (I, r, n) |= KiϕU Kiψ. We want to show that (I, r, n) |=
Ki(KiϕU Kiψ). Thus, if (r
′, n′) ∼i (r, n), we must show that (I, r
′, n′) |= KiϕU Kiψ. Since
(I, r, n) |= KiϕU Kiψ, there exists l ≥ n such that (I, r, l) |= Kiψ and (I, r, k) |= Kiϕ ∧ ¬Kiψ
for all k with n ≤ k < l. Note that this means that if n ≤ k < l, then ri(k) 6= ri(l). Since
I ∈ Cnlm and (r, n) ∼i (r
′, n′), there must be some l′ ≥ n′ such that ((r, n), . . . , (r, l)) is ∼i-
concordant with ((r, n′), . . . , (r, l′)). Thus, there exists some h, a partition S1, . . . , Sh of the
sequence ((r, n), . . . , (r, l)), and a partition T1, . . . , Th of the sequence ((r
′, n′), . . . , (r, l′)) such
that for all j = 1, . . . , h, we have (r, k) ∼i (r
′, k′) for all points (r, k) ∈ Sj and (r
′, k′) ∈ Tj . It
easily follows that (I, r′, n′) |= KiϕU Kiψ, as desired.
For completeness, we define an appropriate enriched+ system. As we shall see, the demands
of no learning make this a little more subtle than in the case of no forgetting.
For the remainder of this section, consistency and provability are with respect to a logic
that includes S5Um +KT4. Fix a consistent formula ψ such that ad(ψ) = d.
Our first step is to prove an analogue of Lemma 5.5.
Lemma 5.11: Suppose that the axiomatization includes KT4. If s is a σ-state, t is a (σ#i)-
state, s ≈i t, and s→ s
′, then there exists a sequence t0, . . . , tk such that (a) t = t0, (b) tj ≈i s
for j < k, (c) tj → tj+1 for j < k, and (d) s
′ ≈i tk.
Proof: If s′ ≈i t, then we can take the sequence to consist only of t, and we are done. Otherwise,
since ϕs∧©ϕs′ is consistent, it follows from Lemma 4.3(b) that ϕs∧KiΦ
+
s,iU KiΦ
+
s′,i is consistent.
Moreover, by Lemma 4.3(c), we have that ϕs ‖− Liϕt. Thus, ϕs ∧ Liϕt ∧ KiΦ
+
s,iU KiΦ
+
s′,i is
consistent. Using KT4, it follows that ϕt∧KiΦ
+
s,iU KiΦ
+
s′,i is consistent. The result now follows
from Lemma 4.7.
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Unfortunately, Lemma 5.11 does not suffice to construct an enriched+ system. Roughly
speaking, the problem is the following. In the case of perfect recall, we used Lemma 5.5 to show
that, given a →-sequence S = (s0, . . . , sn) of σ-states and a (σ#i)-state t such that sn ≈i t, we
can construct a →-sequence T of (σ#i)-states ending with t such that S is ≈i-concordant with
T . There is no problem then extending T to an acceptable sequence. Moreover, we can extend
S and T independently to acceptable sequences; all that matters is that the finite prefixes of
these sequences—namely, S and T—are ≈i-concordant. With no learning, on the other hand, it
is the infinite suffixes that must be ≈i-concordant. Given a→-sequence S = (s0, . . .) of σ-states
and a (σ#i)-state t such that s0 ≈i t, using Lemma 5.11, we can find a →-sequence T starting
with t that is ≈i-concordant with S. This suggests that it is possible to find the appropriate
sequences for the construction of runs satisfying the no learning condition. Unfortunately, it
does not follow from the acceptability of S that T is also acceptable. This makes it necessary
to work with a smaller set of sequences than the set of all acceptable sequences, and to build up
the sequences S and T simultaneously. To ensure that the appropriate obligations are satisfied
at all points in the set of runs constructed, we need to work not just with single states, but
with trees of states.
A k-tree for ψ (with k ≤ d) is a set S of σ-states for ψ with |σ| ≤ k with a unique ǫ-state
such that if s ∈ S is a σ-state then
• if t is a (σ#i)-state such that s ≈i t and |σ#i| ≤ k, then t ∈ S,
• if σ = τ#i, then there is a τ -state t in S such that s ≈i t.
We extend the → relation to k-trees as follows. If S1 and S2 are k-trees for ψ, then S1 →f S2
if f is a function associating with each σ-state s ∈ S1 a finite sequence of σ-states in S1 ∪ S2
such that
• if f(s) = (s0, . . . , sk), then
– s = s0,
– s0 → · · · → sk,
– s0, . . . , sk−1 ∈ S1 and sk ∈ S2;
• if s ≈i s
′, then f(s) and f(s′) are ≈i-concordant;
• for at least one s ∈ S1, the sequence f(s) has length at least 2.
Given two sequences of σ-states α = (s0, . . . , sk) and β = (t0, . . .), where α is finite, the
fusion of α and β, denoted α · β is defined only if sk = t0; in this case, it is the sequence
(s0, sk−1, t0, . . .). Given an infinite sequence S = S0 →f0 S1 →f1 S2 →f2 . . . of k-trees, we say
a sequence α of σ-states is compatible with S if there exists some h, and σ-states sh, sh+1, . . .
with sj ∈ Sj for j ≥ h, such that α = fh(sh) · fh+1(sh+1) · . . .. (Implicit in this notation is the
assumption that this fusion product is defined, so that the last state in fj(sj) is the same as the
first state in fj+1(sj+1), for j ≥ h.) A →-sequence (t0, t1, . . .) of σ-states is a compression of
(s0, s1, . . .) if (1) t0 = s0, and (b) if tj = sh, then tj+1 is sh′, where h
′ is the least integer greater
than h such that sh′−1 → sh′ and sh = · · · = sh′−1. (If no such h
′ exists, then tj is the last
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element of the compression.) S is acceptable if every →-sequence that is a compression of some
sequence compatible with S is infinite and acceptable. Our goal is to construct an acceptable
sequence of d-trees; we shall use this to define the enriched+ system.
Note that by Lemma 4.3, the formula ϕs essentially describes the subtree below s of any
k-tree containing s. Given a k-tree S and a σ-state s in S, we inductively define a formula
treeS,s that describes all of S from the point of view of s. If s is an ǫ-state, then treeS,s = ϕs.
Otherwise, if s is a (τ#i)-state, where τ 6= τ#i, then
treeS,s = ϕs ∧
∧
{τ−states t: s≈it}
LitreeS,t.
If S and T are k-trees, s ∈ S, and t ∈ T , then we write (S, s) →+ (T, t) if there exists a
sequence of k-trees S0, . . . , Sl and functions f0, . . . , fl−1 such that S0 →f0 · · · →fl−1 Sl, S0 = S,
Sl = T , fj(s) = (s) for j ≤ l − 2, and fl−1(s) = (s, t).
Lemma 5.12: Suppose that the axiomatization includes KT4, S is a k-tree, and s is a σ-state
in S, where |σ| = k.
(a) If t is a σ-state and treeS,s∧©(ϕt∧ ξ) is consistent, then there exists a k-tree T such that
t ∈ T , (S, s)→+ (T, t), and treeT,t ∧ ξ is consistent.
(b) treeS,s ⇒ ©
∨
{(T,t): (S,s)→+(T,t)} treeT,t is provable.
(c) If treeS,s ∧ ϕU ϕ
′ is consistent, then for some l ≥ 0 there is a sequence S0, . . . , Sl of
k-trees and states s0, . . . , sl such that (i) sj ∈ Sj, (ii) (S, s) = (S0, s0), (iii) (Sj , sj) →
+
(Sj+1, sj+1) for j = 0, . . . , l − 1, (iv) treeSj ,sj ∧ ϕ is consistent for j = 0, . . . , l − 1, and
(v) treeSl,sl ∧ ϕ
′ is consistent.
Proof: We proceed by induction on k. The case that k = 0 is immediate using standard
arguments, since then treeS,s is just ϕs.
So suppose k > 0 and σ = τ#i, with σ 6= τ . We first prove part (a) in the case that ξ is
of the form Kiξ
′, then part (b), then prove the general case of (a), and then prove (c). First
consider (a) in the case that ξ is of the form Kiξ
′. Note that treeS,s ∧©(ϕt ∧ Kiξ
′) implies
treeS,s ∧KiΦs,iU Ki(ξ
′ ∧Φt,i). From the definition of k-tree, it follows that there is a τ -state s
′
in S such that s ≈i s
′. Let S′ be the (k−1)-tree consisting of all σ′-states in S with |σ′| ≤ k−1.
From KT4, it follows that
treeS′,s′ ∧KiΦs,iU Ki(ξ
′ ∧ Φt,i)
is consistent. Applying part (c) of the inductive hypothesis, we get a sequence S0, . . . , Sl of
(k − 1)-trees and states s0, . . . , sl such that (i) sj ∈ Sj, (ii) (S
′, s′) = (S0, s0), (iii) (Sj , sj) →
+
(Sj+1, sj+1) for j = 0, . . . , l − 1, (iv) treeSj ,sj ∧KiΦs,i is consistent for j = 0, . . . , l − 1, and (v)
treeSl,sl ∧Ki(ξ
′ ∧Φt,i) is consistent. It follows by definition that there is a sequence T0, . . . , Tm
of (k − 1)-trees and functions f0, . . . , fm−1 such that T0 →f0→ · · · →fm−1 Tm, T0 = S0, and
Tm = Sl. Moreover, there are elements t0, . . . , tm such that t0 = s
′, tm = sl, if j < m,
then tj = sj′ for some j
′ ≤ j, and if tj = tj+1, then fj(tj) = (tj), while if tj 6= tj+1, then
fj(tj) = (tj , tj+1), for j = 0, . . . ,m− 1.
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Let T ′j be the unique k-tree extending Tj , for j = 0, . . . ,m. Since ϕtj ∧KiΦs,i is consistent
for j < m, we have that tj ≈i s, and so s ∈ T
′
j for j < m. Similarly, we have that t ∈ T
′
m.
We now show how to construct f ′j, for j < m. For each state u
′ ∈ T ′j − Tj , there must exist a
state u ∈ Tj and an agent j
′ such that u ≈j′ u
′. (There may be more than one such state u,
of course. In this case, in the construction below, we can pick u arbitrarily.) It easily follows
from Lemma 5.11 that there exists a sequence αu′ starting with u
′ that is ≈j′-concordant with
fj(u). Moreover, we can take αtj = (s) for j < m− 1, and take αtm−1 = (s, t). We define f
′
j so
that it agrees with fj on Tj , and for each u
′ ∈ T ′j − Tj , we have f
′
j(u
′) = αu′ .
Notice that T ′0 = S. If m > 0, it follows immediately from the definition that (S, s) →
+
(Tm, t), and that treeTm,t ∧Kiξ
′ is consistent. If m = 0, it is easy to check that we must have
t ∈ S, for we have s′ ≈i t. Since we also have s
′ ≈i s, it follows that s ≈i t. Define f so
that f(u) = (u) for u 6= s and f(s) = (s, t). Then (S, s) →f (S, t). Since s → t, we have
(S, s)→+ (S, t). This completes the proof of part (a).
To prove part (b), suppose not. Then treeS,s ∧©
∧
{(T,t): (S,s)→+(T,t)} ¬treeT,t is consistent.
Straightforward temporal reasoning shows that there must be some u such that
treeS,s ∧©(ϕu ∧
∧
{(T,t): (S,s)→+(T,t)}
¬treeT,t) (3)
is consistent. Now ¬treeT,t is equivalent to ¬ϕt ∨
∨
{τ−states t′: t′≈it}Ki¬treeT,t′ . Thus, it follows
that the consistency of (3) implies that for each tree T such that (S, s) →+ (T, u), there is a
τ -state tT ≈i u such that
treeS,s ∧©(ϕu ∧Ki(
∧
{T : (S,s)→+(T,u)}
¬treeT,tT )) (4)
is consistent. By part (a), there exists a k-tree T ′ and t′ ∈ T ′ such that (S, s) →+ (T ′, t′) and
treeT ′,t′ ∧ ϕu ∧Ki(
∧
{T : (S,s)→+(T,u)} ¬treeT,tT ) is consistent. But this means that t
′ = u. Thus,
we have a contradiction, since treeT ′,u ∧Ki¬treeT ′,tT ′ is inconsistent.
The general case of (a) follows easily from (b). Part (c) also follows from part (b), using
arguments much like those of Lemma 4.7; we omit details here.
Lemma 5.13: Suppose that the axiomatization includes KT4 and ψ is consistent. Then there
is an acceptable sequence of d-trees such that ψ is true at the root of the first tree.
Proof: The key part of the proof is to show that given a finite sequence S0 →f0 . . . →fl−1 Sl
of d-trees and a σ-state s in Sl such that s ‖− ©ϕ (resp., s ‖− ϕ1 U ϕ2), we can extend the
sequence of trees in such a way as to satisfy this obligation. This follows easily from Lemmas 5.11
and 5.12. In more detail, suppose s ‖− ϕ1 U ϕ2. Let S
′ be consist of all τ -states in Sl, with
|τ | ≤ k = |σ|. By Lemma 5.12, we can find a sequence of k-trees starting with S′ that satisfies
this obligation. Using Lemma 5.11, we can extend this to a sequence of d-trees starting with Sl
that satisfies the obligation. The argument in the case that sk ‖− ©ϕ is similar. We can then
take care of the obligations one by one, and construct an acceptable sequence, in the obvious
way.
Since ψ is consistent, there must be some tree S with root s0 such that s0 ‖− ψ. We just
extend S as above to complete the proof.
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Once we have an acceptable sequence S of d-trees as in Lemma 5.13, we can easily con-
struct the enriched+ system much as we did in the case of perfect recall. Given a →-sequence
s0 → s1 → . . . the nl-run r derived from it is defined so that re(n) = sn and ri(n) =
Oi(sn)#Oi(sn+1)# . . ., for each agent i and n ≥ 0. Thus, while for perfect recall, we take
ri(n) to consist of the agent’s current information up to time n, for no learning, we take ri(n)
to consist of the current information from time n on. The construction stresses the duality
between perfect recall and no learning. Let Rnl consist of all the nl-runs derived from →-
sequences that are compressions of sequences of states compatible with S. Again, the function
Σ is given by Σ(r, n) = sn for each n ≥ 0.
Lemma 5.14: Suppose the axiomatization includes KT4. Then (Rnl ,Σ) is an enriched+ sys-
tem.
Proof: Again, Conditions 1 and 2 in the definition of enriched+ system follow immediately
from the construction. For Condition 3′, suppose that (r, n) is a point in the system, Σ(r, n) is
a σ-state, and s is a (σ#i)-state with s ≈i Σ(r, n). Suppose S = S0 →f0 S1 →f1 S2 →f2 . . .. By
definition, the run nl-run r is derived from the compression of some sequence (s0, s1, s2, . . .) of
σ-states compatible with S. Suppose Σ(r, n) is in the interval of this sequence from Sk. Then
s must also be in Sk. Let (t0, t1, . . .) be the (unique) sequence compatible with S that starts at
s in Sk. Let r
′ be the run derived from the compression of this sequence. Then, by definition,
we have Σ(r′, 0) = s and (r, n) ∼i (r
′, 0).
Take Inl to be the system obtained from (Rnl ,Σ). By construction, this system is in Cnl .
Now take any ǫ-state s such that s ‖− ψ, and let r be a run derived from the compression of a
sequence compatible with S starting with s. It follows that (I, r, 0) |= ψ. Thus, ψ is satisfiable
in Cnlm . This completes the proof of Theorem 3.6.
5.5 Dealing with Cnl ,prm and C
nl ,pr ,uis
1 (Theorem 3.7)
We now want to show that S5Um +KT3+KT4 is sound and complete for KLm with respect to
Cnl ,prm . Soundness is immediate from Lemmas 5.4 and 5.10.
For completeness, we construct an enriched+ system much as in the proof of Theorem 3.6,
using k-trees. By Lemma 5.13, there is an acceptable sequence S of d-trees such that ψ is true
at the root of the first tree. Given a →-sequence (s0, s1, ....), the nl-nf run r derived from it is
defined so that re(n) = sn and ri(n) = (Oi(s0)#Oi(s1)# . . .#Oi(sn), Oi(sn)#Oi(sn+1)# . . .),
for each agent i and n ≥ 0. Thus, the agents’ local states enforce both perfect recall (by
keeping track of all the information up to time n) and no learning (by keeping track of the
current information from time n on). Let Rnl ,pr consist of all nl-nf-runs that are derived from
→-sequences that have a suffix that is the compression of a sequence of states compatible
with S. Note that now we consider →-sequences whose suffixes are compressions of sequences
compatible with S. The reason to allow the greater generality of suffixes will become clear
shortly. Since S is acceptable, it is easy to see that every such→-sequence must be infinite and
acceptable. Again, the function Σ is given by Σ(r, n) = sn for each n ≥ 0.
Lemma 5.15: Suppose the axiomatization includes KT3 and KT4. Then (Rnl ,pr ,Σ) is an
enriched+ system.
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Proof: As usual, Conditions 1 and 2 in the definition of enriched+ system follow immediately
from the construction. For Condition 3′, suppose that (r, n) is a point in the system, Σ(r, n) is a
σ-state, and s is a (σ#i)-state. Suppose S = S0 →f0 S1 →f1 S2 →f2 . . .. By definition, the run
nl–pr -run r is derived from a→-sequence (s0, s1, . . .) that has a suffix (sN , sN+1, . . .) that is the
compression of some sequence (t0, t1, t2, . . .) of σ-states compatible with S, and Σ(r, n) = sn.
There are now two cases to consider. If n ≥ N , then there exists some k such that sn is in Sk.
Then s must also be in Sk. Let (u0, u1, . . .) be the unique sequence compatible with S that
starts with s in Sk. By Lemma 5.5, there exist σ#i-states v0 → · · · → vh such that vh = s
and (v0, . . . , vh) is ≈i-compatible with (s0, . . . , sn). Consider the →-sequence formed from the
fusion of (v0, . . . , vh) and the compression of (u0, u1, . . .). By construction, the nl–pr -run r
′
derived from this →-sequence is in Rnl ,pr , Σ(r′, h) = s, and (r, n) ∼i (r
′, h).
Now suppose n < N . By Lemma 5.5, there exist (σ#i)-states v0 → · · · → vh such that
vh = s and (v0, . . . , vh) is ≈i-concordant with (s0, ..., sn). Moreover, by Lemma 5.11, this
sequence can be extended to a sequence (v0, ....vk) that is ≈i-concordant with (s0, ..., sN ). Since
sN ∈ SM for some M , we must have vk ∈ SM . Let (u0, u1, . . .) be the unique sequence
compatible with S that starts at vk in SM . Consider the →-sequence formed from the fusion
of (v0, . . . , vk) and the compression of (u0, u1, . . .). By construction, the nl–pr -run r
′ derived
from this →-sequence is in Rnl ,pr , Σ(r′, h) = s, and (r, n) ∼i (r
′, h).
Again, we complete the proof by taking Inl,pr to be the system obtained from (Rnl ,pr ,Σ).
By construction, this system is in Cnl ,pr and satisfies ψ. This shows that S5Um +KT3 + KT4 is
a sound and complete axiomatization for the language KLm with respect to C
nl ,pr
m for all m.
The fact that it is also a sound and complete axiomatization for the language KL1 with
respect to Cnl ,pr ,uis1 follows immediately from the following lemma.
Lemma 5.16: The formula ψ ∈ KL1 is satisfiable with respect to C
nl ,pr
1 (resp., C
nl,pr ,sync
1 ) iff
it is satisfiable with respect to Cnl ,pr ,uis1 (resp., C
nl ,pr ,sync,uis
1 ).
Proof: Clearly if ψ is satisfiable with respect to Cnl ,pr ,uis1 (resp., C
nl ,pr ,sync,uis
1 ) it is satisfiable
with respect to Cnl ,pr1 (resp., C
nl ,pr ,sync
1 ). For the converse, suppose that (I, r
∗, n∗) |= ψ, where
I = (R, π) ∈ Cnl ,pr1 . For each run r ∈ R, define the run r
+ just as in Lemma 5.3, to be
the result of adding a new initial state to r. Let R′ = {r+ : (r, 0) ∼1 (r
∗, 0)}. Define π′
as on R′ as in Lemma 5.3, so that π′(r+, 0)(p) = false for all primitive propositions p, and
π′(r+, n + 1) = π(r, n). Let I ′ = (R′, π′). Clearly I ′ ∈ Cnl ,pr ,uis1 , and if I is synchronous, then
so is I ′. We claim that (I ′, r+, n + 1) |= ϕ iff (I, r, n) |= ϕ for all formulas ϕ ∈ KL1 and all
r+ ∈ R′. We prove this by induction on the structure of ϕ. The only nontrivial case is if ϕ is
of the form K1ϕ
′. But this case is immediate from the observation that if r+ ∈ R′, r′ ∈ R, and
(r, n) ∼1 (r
′, n′), then since I is a system of perfect recall, we must have (r, 0) ∼1 (r
′, 0), and
hence (r′)+ ∈ R′. We leave details of the proof of the claim to the reader. From the claim, it
follows that ψ is satisfiable in Cnl ,pr ,uis1 , and that if ψ is satisfiable in C
nl ,pr ,sync
1 , then it is also
satisfiable in Cnl ,pr ,sync,uis1 .
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5.6 Dealing with Cnl ,syncm (Theorem 3.8)
We now want to show that S5Um+KT5 is sound and complete for KLm with respect to C
nl ,sync
m .
Soundness follows from the following lemma.
Lemma 5.17: All instances of KT5 are valid in Cnl ,syncm .
Proof: Suppose I ∈ Cnl ,syncm and (I, r, n) |= ©Kiϕ. We want to show that (I, r, n) |= Ki©ϕ.
Thus, suppose that (r′, n′) ∼i (r, n). We must show that (I, r
′, n′) |= ©ϕ. By synchrony, we
must have n′ = n. Moreover, by no learning and synchrony, we have that (r, n+1) ∼i (r
′, n+1).
Since (I, r, n + 1) |= Kiϕ, it follows that (I, r
′, n+ 1) |= ϕ, and hence that (I, r′, n) |= ©ϕ, as
desired.
For completeness, we construct an enriched+ system much as in the proof of Theorem 3.6,
using k-trees, with an appropriate strengthening of the → relation.
We start by proving the following analogue of Lemma 5.11.
Lemma 5.18: Suppose that the axiomatization includes KT5. If s is a σ-state, t is a (σ#i)-
state, s ≈i t, and s→ s
′, then there exists a (σ#i)-state t′ such that t→ t′ and s′ ≈i t
′.
Proof: Since ϕs ∧ ©ϕs′ is consistent, it follows from Lemma 4.3(b) that ϕs0 ∧ ©KiΦ
+
s′,i is
consistent. Moreover, by Lemma 4.3(c), we have that ϕs ‖− Liϕt. Thus, ϕs ∧Liϕt ∧©KiΦ
+
s′,i
is consistent. Using KT5, it follows that ϕs ∧ Liϕt ∧ Ki©Φ
+
s′,i is consistent. It follows that
ϕt ∧©Φ
+
s′,i is consistent. Hence, there is some (σ#i)-state t
′ such that s′ ≈i t
′ and ϕt ∧©ϕt′
is consistent. Thus, we have s′ ≈i t
′ and t→ t′.
If S and T are k-trees, s ∈ S, and t ∈ T , we define (S, s) →sync,+ (T, t) if S →f T for
some f such that f(s) = (s, t) and f(s′) has length 2 for all s′ ∈ S. We now get the following
simplification of Lemma 5.12.
Lemma 5.19: Suppose that the axiomatization includes KT5, S is a k-tree, and s is a σ-state
in S, where |σ| = k.
(a) If treeS,s ∧ ©(ϕt ∧ ξ) is consistent, then there exists a k-tree T and t ∈ T such that
(S, s)→sync,+ (T, t) and treeT,t ∧ ξ is consistent.
(b) treeS,s ⇒ ©
∨
{(T,t): (S,s)→sync,+(T,t)} treeT,t is provable.
(c) If treeS,s ∧ ϕU ϕ
′ is consistent, then there is a sequence S0, . . . , Sl of k-trees and states
s0, . . . , sl such that (i) sj ∈ Sj, (ii) (S, s) = (S0, s0), (iii) (Sj , sj)→
sync,+ (Sj+1, sj+1) for
j = 0, . . . , l− 1, (iv) treeSj ,sj ∧ϕ is consistent for j = 0, . . . , l− 1, and (v) treeSl,sl ∧ϕ
′ is
consistent.
Proof: The proof is like that of Lemma 5.12, using Lemma 5.18 instead of Lemma 5.11. We
leave details to the reader.
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We can then define a sync-acceptable sequence of trees by replacing →+ by →sync,+ in
the definition of acceptable sequence of trees. Using Lemma 5.19, we can show that if the
axiom system contains KT5, then we can construct an infinite sync-acceptable sequence S =
S0 →
sync,+ S1 →
sync,+ S2 →
sync,+ . . . of d-trees. As in Section 5.1, we use an object x not equal
to any state. Given a →-sequence sN → sN+1 → . . . starting at sN ∈ SN the nl–sync-run r
derived from it is defined so that re(n) = sn for n ≥ N , else re(n) = x, and for each agent i,
if n ≥ N then ri(n) = (n,Oi(sn)Oi(sn+1) . . .), else ri(n) = (n, x
N−nOi(sn)Oi(sn+1) . . .). Thus,
the local state of the agent enforces synchrony (by encoding the time) and enforces no learning.
Let Rnl ,sync consist of all nl–sync-runs derived from→-sequences compatible with S, and define
Σ by taking Σ(r, n) = sn for n ≥ N and Σ(r, n) undefined for n < N .
Lemma 5.20: Suppose the axiomatization includes KT5. Then (Rnl ,sync,Σ) is an enriched+
system.
Proof: The proof is essentially the same as that of Lemma 5.14. We leave details to the reader.
We complete the proof of Theorem 3.8 just as we did all the previous proofs.
5.7 Dealing with Cnl ,pr ,syncm (Theorem 3.9)
We now want to show that S5Um +KT2+KT5 is sound and complete for KLm with respect to
Cnl ,pr ,syncm . Soundness follows from Lemmas 5.7 and 5.17.
For completeness, we construct an enriched+ system by combining the ideas of the proofs
of Theorems 3.7 and 3.8. Using Lemma 5.19, we can show that if the axiom system contains
KT5, then we can construct an infinite sync-acceptable sequence S of d-trees. Given a →-
sequence s0 → s1 → . . ., the nl–pr–sync-run r derived from it is defined so that re(n) = sn
and ri(n) = (Oi(s1) . . . Oi(sn), Oi(sn)Oi(sn+1) . . .). Thus, the local state of the agent enforces
both no forgetting and no learning. It also enforces synchrony, since the agent can determine
n from the length of the first of the two seqeunces in its local state. Let Rnl ,pr ,sync consist of
all nl–pr–sync-runs derived from →-sequences with suffixes that are compatible with S; again,
we define Σ by taking Σ(r, n) = sn.
Using ideas similar to those in earlier proofs, we can now prove the following result.
Lemma 5.21: Suppose the axiomatization includes KT2 and KT5. Then (Rnl ,pr ,sync,Σ) is an
enriched+ system.
We complete the proof of Theorem 3.9 just as we did the earlier proofs.
5.8 Dealing with Cnl ,sync,uism and C
nl ,pr ,sync,uis
m (Theorem 3.10)
Finally, we want to show that S5Um + KT2 + KT5 + {Kiϕ ≡ K1ϕ} is sound and complete for
KLm with respect to C
nl ,sync,uis
m and C
nl ,pr ,sync,uis
m . Soundness follows easily using the following
result, which is Proposition 3.9 in [HV89] (restated using our notation).
Proposition 5.22:
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(a) Cnl ,sync,uism = C
nl,pr ,sync,uis
m .
(b) Any formula ϕ in KLm is equivalent in C
nl ,sync,uis
m to the formula ϕ
′ that results by re-
placing all occurrences of Ki, i ≥ 2, by K1.
It follows from part (a) of Proposition 5.22 that the same axioms characterize Cnl ,sync,uism and
Cnl ,pr ,sync,uism . Now using Theorems 5.7 and 5.17, the soundness of KT2 and KT5 follows. The
soundness of Kiϕ ≡ K1ϕ follows from part (b).
For completeness, using the axiom Kiϕ ≡ K1ϕ, it suffices to show the completeness of
S5U1 +KT2+KT5 with respect to C
nl ,pr ,sync,uis
1 . By Theorem 3.9, this axiomatization is complete
with respect to Cnl ,pr ,sync1 . The result now follows using Lemma 5.16.
6 Remarks on No Learning
We noted in Section 2 that the definition of no learning adopted in this paper differs from that
used in [HV86, HV89]. We now comment on the reason for this change and the relationship
between these alternative definitions of no learning.
First, recall from part (d) of Lemma 2.2 that that agent i has perfect recall in system R if
and only if
(∗) for all points (r, n) ∼i (r
′, n′) in R, if k ≤ n, then there exists k′ ≤ n′ such that (r, k) ∼i
(r′, k′).
Intuitively, no learning is the dual of perfect recall, so it seems reasonable to define no learning
by replacing references to the past in a definition of perfect recall by references to the future.
This was done in [HV86, HV89], where the definition given for no learning was the following
future time variant of condition (∗), which we call no learning′, to distinguish it from our current
definition: Agent i does not learn′ in system R if and only if
(∗∗) for all points (r, n) ∼i (r
′, n′) in R, if k ≥ n then there exists k′ ≥ n′ such that (r, k) ∼i
(r′, k′).
The following lemma states a number of relations holding between condition (∗∗) and the other
properties we have considered in this paper.
Lemma 6.1:
(a) If agent i does not learn in system R then agent i does not learn′ in system R.
(b) If system R is synchronous or if agent i has perfect recall in R, then agent i does not
learn in R iff agent i does not learn′ in R.
Proof: We first show (a). Suppose that agent i does not learn in R. Assume that (r, n) ∼i
(r′, n′) and let k ≥ n. Since i does not learn, the future local state sequences at (r, n) and
(r′, n′) are equal. It follows that there exists k′ ≥ n′ such that (r, k) ∼i (r
′, k′). Thus, agent i
does not learn′.
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For (b), it follows from part (a) that it suffices to show the implication from no learning′ to
no learning. We consider the cases of synchrony and perfect recall independently. In each case,
we show that if (r, n) ∼i (r
′, n′) then there exists k ≥ n′ such that the sequences ((r, n), (r, n+1))
and ((r′, n′) . . . (r′, k)) are ∼i-concordant. It then follows by Lemma 2.3 that agent i does not
learn.
Assume first that R is a synchronous system, and that (r, n) ∼i (r
′, n′). By synchrony,
we must have n = n′. By no learning′, there exists k ≥ n such that (r, n + 1) ∼i (r
′, k). By
synchrony, k must equal n+ 1. It is immediate that ((r, n), (r, n + 1)) and ((r′, n′), (r′, n′ + 1))
are ∼i-concordant.
Next, assume that agent i has perfect recall in R, and that (r, n) ∼i (r
′, n′). By no learning′,
there exists k ≥ n′ such that (r, n+1) ∼i (r
′, k). By perfect recall, agent i’s local state sequences
(r, n+1) and (r′, k) are identical, as are the local state sequences at (r, n) and (r′, n′). It follows
that the sequences ((r, n), (r, n + 1)) and ((r′, n′), . . . , (r′, k)) are ∼i-concordant.
Thus, in the context of either synchrony or perfect recall, no learning and no learning′ are
equivalent. However, in systems without synchrony or perfect recall, no learning′ is strictly
weaker than no learning, as the following example shows. Consider the system R = {r1, r2} for
a single agent, where the runs are defined by:
r1(n) =


(se, a) if n = 0
(se, b) if n > 0 is odd
(se, c) if n > 0 is even
where se is some state of the environment, and a, b, c are local states of agent 1, and similarly
r2(n) =


(se, a) if n = 0
(se, c) if n > 0 is odd
(se, d) if n > 0 is even
This system clearly satisfies uis and condition (∗∗), so we have no learning′ (for both agents).
However, agent 1’s future local state sequences from the points (r1, 0) ∼1 (r
2, 0) are not ∼1-
concordant, so we do not have no learning. Thus, no learning and no learning′ are distinct in
general.
This raises the question of which of variant to take as the definition of no learning for
the cases Cnl and Cuis ,nl . The origin of this notion in the literature lies in Ladner and Reif’s
paper [LR86], where it is motivated as arising in the context of blindfold games. Their logic
LLP assumes perfect recall, so is not decisive on the distinction. However, it seems that the
behavior in the above example is somewhat unnatural for this application, and the definition
we have adopted in this paper better fits the intuition of a player in a blindfold game following
a fixed linear strategy, but with some uncertainty about timing. It is such examples that in
fact led us to use the current definition of no learning.
It is worth noting that the example above also shows that the axiom KT4 is not sound with
respect to the class of systems satisfying (∗∗). Define the interpretation π of the propositions
p and q on runs r ∈ R by π(r, n)(p) = true iff r1(n) = a and π(r, n)(q) = true iff r1(n) = b.
Let I = (R, π). It is then readily seen that (I, r1, 0) |= K1pU K1q but not (I, r
1, 0) |=
K1(K1pU K1q). Hence KT4 fails in this system. (This example is a future time version of an
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example used in [Mey94] to show that the axiom KT1 is incomplete for systems with perfect
recall.) We have not investigated the issue of axiomatization using no learning′ rather than no
learning in the two cases where there is a difference—Cnlm and C
nl,uis
1 . We conjecture that, while
there will be a relatively clean complete axiomatization in these cases, it will not be as elegant
as the one proposed here. That is, the axiom that captures no learning will be somewhat more
complicated than KT4. This conjecture is in line with our feeling that no learning is the “right”
definition, not no learning′.
We remark that the complexity results of [HV86, HV89] are proved in the context of no
learning′, but it is relatively straightforward to show that the same results hold if we use the
definition of no learning instead.
7 Discussion
While we have looked in this paper at the effect on axiomatization of some combinations of
classes of systems and language (48 in all!), there are certainly other cases of interest. One issue
we have already mentioned is that of braching time versus linear time. Basing the temporal
fragment of the language on branching time yields another 48 logics, whose complexity is studied
in [HV86]. We would conjecture that the obvious translations of the axioms we have presented
here deal with branching time, with similar proofs of completeness, but this remains to be
verified.
It is worth remarking that our results are very sensitive to the language studied. As we have
seen, the language considered in this paper is too coarse to reflect some properties of systems. In
the absence of the other properties, synchrony and unique initial states do not require additional
axioms. This may no longer be true for richer languages. For example, if we allow past-time
operators [LPZ85], we need not only the additional axioms capturing the properties of these,
but also new axioms describing the interaction of knowledge and time. Suppose that we add
an operator ⊖ such that (I, r, n) |= ⊖ϕ if n ≥ 1 and (I, r, n − 1) |= ϕ. Notice that ¬ ⊖ true
expresses the property “the time is 0” and ⊖¬ ⊖ true expresses the property “the time is 1”.
Similarly, we can inductively define formulas that express the property “the time is m” for each
m ≥ 0. If time=m is an abbreviation for this formula, then time = m ⇒ Ki(time = m) is valid
in Csync , for each time m.
On the other hand, by adding past time operators we can simplify the axiom for perfect
recall. Introducing the operator S for “since”, we may show that the formula
(Kiϕ)S(Kiψ)⇒ Ki((Kiϕ)S(Kiψ))
is valid in Cpr . This axiom very neatly expresses the meaning of perfect recall, and a comparison
with KT4 shows clearly the sense in which perfect recall is a dual of no learning. Techniques
similar to those developed in this paper may be used to prove that this axiom, together with
the usual axioms for past time [LPZ85] and for knowledge, yields a complete axiomatization
for Cpr .
Besides changes to the language, there are also additional properties of systems worth
considering. One case of interest is the class of asynchronous message passing systems of
[FHMV95]. That extra axioms are required in such systems is known ([FHMV95] Exercise 8.8),
but the question of complete axiomatization is still open.
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